

Perpetrator Identity and Public Responses to Civilian Victimization

Gabriella Levy

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Abstract

How does perpetrator identity shape the ways that people respond to civilian victimization? I argue that people assess violence by their preferred armed actors as less morally wrong and less deserving of harsh punishment than violence committed by armed groups they dislike. I suggest that three possible mechanisms may explain why: perpetrator identity may shape beliefs about the causes of the violence, i.e. whether it is militarily necessary; the consequences of the violence, i.e. whether it harms a lot of people; or the attribution of responsibility for the violence, i.e. whether the armed group as a whole bears responsibility. To test this argument, I utilize an online survey experiment in Colombia with 1,500 respondents in which individuals read a news story about an allegation of violence against civilians perpetrated by either the state or guerrillas. The results suggest that judgements of appropriate punishment, but not evaluations of moral wrongfulness, are shaped by perpetrator identity. Furthermore, people justify reduced punishments for armed groups they support by characterizing the violence as less severe and less systematic but not as less necessary. These findings provide insight into the ways in which armed group and transitional justice institution messaging may shape perceptions of violence against civilians.

Introduction

How does perpetrator identity shape the ways that people respond to civilian victimization? A wide range of evidence suggests that people do not react as negatively to violence against civilians committed by some groups as they do to similar violence perpetrated by other groups. For example, research on conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Spain indicates that violence against civilians has differential effects on subsequent levels of support for armed groups, volumes of violence, and political affiliations of civilians based on the identity of the perpetrator (Lyal, Blair and Kosuke 2013; Condra and Shapiro 2012; Balcells 2012). While these studies focus on the long-term consequences of violence, Silverman (2019) concludes that perpetrator identity also affects approval of individual military strikes in Pakistan.

However, we know little about the precise mechanisms by which characteristics of the perpetrator affect how people interpret and respond to violence against civilians. Lyal, Blair and Kosuke (2013) theorize that the identity of the perpetrator impacts whether people think that the group was compelled by a given situation to behave poorly or, alternatively, whether they think the perpetrators are innately flawed. In other words, perpetrator identity could shape beliefs about the *causes* of the violence. However, Lyal, Blair and Kosuke (2013) do not directly test this theory. In contrast, Silverman (2019) proposes and tests another possibility, that perpetrator identity shapes beliefs about the *consequences* of the violence. I focus on a key consequence of violence: the level of harm it inflicts. A third mechanism, whereby identity shapes attributions of who bears *responsibility* for the violence, emerges from a review of literature in psychology on blame judgements (e.g. Alicke 2000; Malle 2021). More specifically, perpetrator identity could influence whether observers consider the entire armed organization or merely the direct perpetrators responsible. In summary, perpetrator identity could shape beliefs about the causes of violence, i.e. whether it was necessary; the consequences of violence, i.e. whether it harmed a lot of people; or who bears responsibility for, it i.e. whether the group's leadership is responsible. All three mechanisms could plausibly explain why violence committed by some groups has a less negative impact

on public attitudes toward perpetrators than violence committed by other groups.

I test this theoretical framework with a factorial survey experiment fielded online in Colombia in which respondents are presented with a news article about a recent act of violence against civilians committed either by FARC dissidents or the Colombian Armed Forces. They then respond to a series of questions about how morally wrong the violence is, how much punishment the perpetrators should receive, whether the violence was militarily necessary, how severe the violence was, and whether the group's leaders are responsible. I examine whether people do indeed believe that violence committed by some armed groups is less morally wrong and merits less punishment than violence committed by other groups, as existing literature would suggest. Next, I consider whether people's beliefs about the causes of, consequences of, and responsibility for the violence vary based on which actor perpetrated the violence. I also consider whether these effect sizes vary based on individuals' levels of support for the Armed Forces. Lastly, I examine whether people who believe that the violence was necessary, that it wasn't very severe, or that the group's leadership is not responsible are less likely to believe that the violence is morally wrong and its perpetrators should be harshly punished.

Overall, the results suggest that people justify lighter punishments for members of their favored armed groups by characterizing the violence against civilians these groups commit as less severe and less organized. More precisely, respondents prefer less harsh punishments for armed groups they like. Further, they characterize violence by armed groups they support as less severe and less likely to be the responsibility of the organization as a whole. Relatedly, they characterize less severe violence and violence which is not the responsibility of group leadership as less morally wrong and less deserving of harsh punishment. In contrast, they do not characterize violence committed by groups they support as less morally wrong than violence committed by other armed groups. Respondents also do not describe violence by their preferred armed organization as more necessary for military gains.

Theory

I make three assumptions which define the scope conditions for the theory elucidated below. Firstly, I assume that violence against civilians is a valence issue, meaning that people have the same position on the issue and see it as negative (e.g. Stokes 1963; Congleton, Grofman and Voigt 2018). This is a plausible assumption given the wide range of literature about how civilians oppose violence against civilians (e.g. Wood 2003; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007) and have internalized many norms of international law, which includes prohibitions on direct targeting of civilians (e.g. Wallace 2019; Dill and Schubiger 2021). Indeed, according to a Red Cross 2016 survey, 78 percent of people living in countries affected by armed conflict believe that it is wrong to attack enemy combatants even “in populated villages or towns in order to weaken the enemy, knowing that many civilians would be killed” (ICRC 2016, p. 7). Disapproval of direct targeting of civilians is likely even higher. Because I assume that civilian targeting is broadly seen as negative, I exclude cases of genocide or ethnic cleansing from this theory; in such cases, many people may see civilian targeting as normatively positive. Secondly, I focus on conflicts in which violence against civilians is common and publicized because I assume that neither armed groups nor civilians can plausibly deny that violence has occurred. Third, while many conflicts in reality feature more than two armed groups, for simplification purposes I model individual preferences within a simple two-party conflict. In summary, I focus on conflicts in which there is extensive civilian targeting but no genocide or ethnic cleansing, modeling them as two-party wars.

I define civilian preferences as fundamentally attitudinal, meaning that they are a matter of private preferences rather than public behaviors (e.g. Kuran 1998). When someone prefers one group to another, they are more supportive of that group than the alternative one. In other words, preference is not a matter of absolute levels of support for a group but rather a matter of relative levels of support for one group compared to another.

I argue that people are less likely to think that civilian targeting is morally wrong and its perpetrators should be harshly punished when the violence has been committed by their

preferred armed group. I further argue that there are three possible mechanisms which could explain these relationships; perpetrator identity could shape beliefs about the causes of the violence, i.e. whether it is militarily necessary, consequences of the violence, i.e. whether it harms a lot of people, or attribution of responsibility for the violence, i.e. whether the armed group as a whole is responsible. This argument implies two distinct sets of hypotheses. Firstly, people are more likely to believe the violence is militarily necessary, less likely to believe it is severe, and less likely to believe that the the armed group as a whole is responsible when the violence is committed by their preferred armed groups in comparison to when it is committed by other groups. It is also possible that these effects are larger among those with a stronger preference for one armed group over the other. Secondly, people who believe that violence is necessary and less severe, as well as those who do not think the group as a whole is responsible, are less likely to see the violence as morally wrong and to believe that its perpetrators should be harshly punished.

Perpetrator Identity and Responses to Violence

Several studies focusing on countries in which fighting is occurring have examined how perpetrator identity shapes the impact of civilian victimization on public support for armed groups. For example, Lyall, Blair and Kosuke (2013) utilize an endorsement survey experiment in Afghanistan and find that, while violence against civilians inflicted by the ISAF results in increased support for the Taliban, Taliban violence does not prompt increased support for the ISAF. These authors do not directly examine attitudes toward the violence itself but rather evaluate support for armed groups among individuals living in areas that have experienced varying levels of violence. Similarly, Condra and Shapiro (2012) utilize geo-coded data on violence in Iraq to examine whether killings of civilians by one group predict higher subsequent levels of violence by the other side. While these scholars do not directly survey or interview civilians, they hypothesize that violence perpetrated by one side causes local civilians to share more information with the other side, resulting in a greater number of attacks perpetrated by that other side. They find that anti-insurgent reactions are limited

in Sunni areas, where the insurgency is popular, and anti-Coalition reactions are limited in religiously mixed areas. Additionally, Balcells (2012) utilizes semi structured interviews about civil war and dictatorship in Spain to conclude that victimization only leads to a rejection of the perpetrator along cleavages that were salient during the war. She does not directly ask respondents about their perceptions of the violence but instead focuses on correlations between past familial victimization and current political affiliation. These three papers together provide strong evidence that violence against civilians has differential effects on support for armed groups depending on the perpetrator identity. While none directly focuses on perceptions of violence, perpetrator characteristics must shape people's perceptions of violence in order for perpetrator identity to moderate the impact of violence on these other outcomes. Indeed, there is one piece that does directly examine this topic. Silverman (2019) finds, in a study of violence committed by American and Pakistani troops in Pakistan, that perpetrator identity affects approval of military strikes.

But what is it about “perpetrator identity” that affects the ways in which people respond to civilian targeting? I suggest that what underlies these findings is differences in prior levels of support for various armed groups. In other words, people react less negatively to Pakistani violence than to American violence because they are more supportive of the Pakistani armed forces than American ones. I remain agnostic here about the reasons that people may be more supportive of one group than another one. I theorize that anyone who prefers one group over the other will think that violence committed by his or her preferred group is less wrong than identical violence committed by the other armed group, but it is also possible that people with stronger preferences are more biased. This suggests that the effect size will vary based on preference strength. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:

- *Moral Wrongfulness Hypothesis 1:* People are less likely to believe that violence against civilians is morally wrong when it is committed by their preferred armed group in comparison to when it is committed by an armed group they oppose.
- *Moral Wrongfulness Hypothesis 2:* The stronger an individual's preferences are for an

armed group, the larger the effect size hypothesized above will be.

The studies summarized above also suggest that people actively turn toward supporting those armed groups which oppose the perpetrator, for example by sharing more information with the other group. In doing so, people effectively punish the perpetrators of violence against civilians by engaging in behavior which imposes costs on the perpetrator and makes the group's defeat more likely. This retaliatory behavior is unsurprising in light of a broader literature on violence and punishment. For example, victims frequently support violence against those who have hurt them as a way not only to achieve peace but also to seek revenge (Vinck et al. 2007; Sonis et al. 2009). Similarly, psychological research suggests that people think that offenders ought to be punished as retribution for their crimes (Carlsmith 2006; Carlsmith and Darley 2008; Osgood 2017). People are even willing to punish out-group members who have not directly participated in the violence. For example, individuals react to threats of violence by supporting policies such as aggressive retaliation against out-groups (e.g. Gordon and Arian 2001; Skitka, Bauman and Mullen 2004), and exposure to violence hardens attitudes toward out-groups (for a summary, see Bauer et al. 2016). It is important to note that not all punishment is identical, and punishment is generally proportional to the violation or harm it seeks to remedy. Therefore, acts that are seen as more wrong require harsher punishment. If people think that violence committed by their preferred group is less morally wrong, they are likely also to think that the perpetrators should be less harshly punished. Among those who prefer a given perpetrator group, those whose preference for that group is particularly strong will be even less likely to support harsh punishment for the perpetrators. This logic can be formalized as follows:

- *Punishment Hypothesis 1:* People are less likely to believe that the perpetrators should be harshly punished when violence against civilians is committed by their preferred armed group compared to when it is committed by an armed group they oppose.
- *Punishment Hypothesis 2:* The stronger an individual's preferences are for an armed group, the larger the effect size hypothesized above will be.

Mechanisms

If the above hypotheses are supported, I argue that there are three possible mechanisms which could explain how perpetrator identity alters the effect of violence against civilians on individuals' attitudes toward the violence and its perpetrators. Firstly, perpetrator identity could shape perceptions about the cause of violence, i.e. whether it is necessary for military purposes. Secondly, perpetrator identity could affect beliefs about the consequences of the violence, i.e. how harmful it is. Thirdly, it could influence who people attribute responsibility to, i.e. whether they blame the armed group as a whole.

All of these mechanisms are forms of motivated moral reasoning. Motivated reasoning occurs when an individual's goals or motives affect his or her reasoning. People can be motivated by either directional or accuracy goals; when people have directional goals, they are "motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion" (Kunda 1990, p. 482). To reach this conclusion, they process information in a biased manner, searching for evidence which confirms their preferred conclusions, selectively criticizing unwelcome evidence, and establishing assessment criteria which emphasizes favorable evidence (Kunda 1990; Baumeister and Newman 1994; Ditto, Pizarro and Tannenbaum 2009). Motivated reasoning has been shown to affect political attitudes (e.g. Taber and Lodge 2006; Fischle 2000). Motivated moral reasoning is a particular form of motivated reasoning in which judgement is driven by the goal of reaching a particular moral conclusion (Ditto, Pizarro and Tannenbaum 2009). In the context of evaluating civilian targeting, I suggest that the desirable moral conclusion is that a preferred armed group was less morally wrong in engaging in such abuse and therefore should be punished less. I argue that there are three possible ways people could reach this conclusion.

Firstly, perpetrator identity could impact whether people think that the violence is necessary for victory. Lyall, Blair and Kosuke (2013) suggest but do not directly test a similar theory, building on a long-line of research into intergroup bias (e.g. Hewstone, Rubin and Willis 2002; Tajfel and Turner 1979). They argue that negative actions by one's in-group are seen as situational in nature, meaning that the actors were forced to be bad;

in contrast, negative actions by out-group members are seen as the result of inherent traits. In the context of conflict, the “situation” forcing a preferred armed group to engage in normatively objectionable behavior would be the need to win. As a consequence, supporters could believe that the abuse is necessary for the achievement of military goals. But, if the same violence were committed by a non-preferred group, it would be seen as gratuitous rather than necessary. Indeed, actors are seen as less blameworthy when they have “valid” reasons for engaging in normatively wrong behavior (Monroe and Malle 2019). For example, people are more likely to support torture portrayed as effective (Kearns and Young 2020). Relatedly, Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe (2014) argue that not having an obligation to prevent wrongdoing mitigates moral blame for wrongs committed. In the context of conflict, people could think that armed groups do not have an obligation to limit civilian targeting if engaging in such violence allows them to achieve a greater good, such as winning the war or defeating the enemy. Thus, I hypothesize that perpetrator identity shapes the degree to which people see violence against civilians as helpful for military goals, and I argue that people who see violence against civilians as militarily necessary are less likely to think that it is morally wrong and worthy of harsh punishment.

- *Cause Bias Hypothesis 1:* People are more likely to believe that violence against civilians is necessary for the achievement of military goals when it is committed by their preferred group compared to when it is committed by an armed group they oppose.
- *Cause Bias Hypothesis 2:* The stronger an individual’s preferences are for an armed group, the larger the effect size hypothesized above will be.
- *Cause Bias Hypothesis 3:* People who believe that violence against civilians is necessary for the achievement of military goals are less likely to believe that:
 - *a:* the violence is morally wrong
 - *b:* its perpetrators should be strongly punished

Another possibility is that perpetrator identity shapes beliefs about the severity of the violence, i.e. how much harm it causes. Because wrongdoing is condemned proportionally to the perceived harm that is done to the victim (Gray, Waytz and Young 2012; Schein and Gray 2018), violence which causes less harm is seen as less wrong. Importantly, people can characterize the severity of violence differently even if the number of victims is constant. For example, in a study of attitudes toward the American government’s performance in Iraq under the W. Bush administration, although most people correctly identified the number of casualties, Democrats tended to interpret the number of casualties as “large” rather than “small,” like Republicans (Gaines et al. 2007). Similarly, in a study of Pakistan, Silverman (2019) finds that military operations are seen as twenty-four percentage points more indiscriminate when they are carried out by the United States compared to when they are carried out by Pakistan. Thus, even if the number of victims of violence is constant, people could think that the violence committed by their preferred armed group is less wrong because it doesn’t cause as much suffering or harm. I thus hypothesize the following:

- *Consequences Bias Hypothesis 1:* People are less likely to believe that violence against civilians causes extensive harm when it is committed by their preferred group compared to when it is committed by an armed group they oppose.
- *Consequences Bias Hypothesis 2:* The stronger an individual’s preferences are for an armed group, the larger the effect size hypothesized above will be.
- *Consequences Bias Hypothesis 3:* People who believe that violence against civilians causes more harm are more likely to believe that:
 - *a:* the violence is morally wrong
 - *b:* its perpetrators should be strongly punished

Lastly, perpetrator identity could shape beliefs about whether the group as a whole or the individual perpetrator is responsible for the violence. Importantly, not all violence against civilians in conflict results from a deliberate strategy of an armed group. Some

violence is merely tolerated by the leadership although it is not adopted as an organizational policy (Wood 2018). Other violence occurs against the wishes of leadership, especially if the organization does not utilize discipline and political education (Hoover Green 2016).¹ If an armed group did not have control over an instance of violence against civilians, people may think that the organization is not as responsible for it and thus should not be punished for it. Indeed, individuals with a lot of control over a negative outcome are judged more harshly than those who have less control (Alicke 2000; Malle, Guglielmo and Monroe 2014). Those who lack control are seen as lacking intentionality (Quillien and German 2021), which also mitigates blame (for a summary, see Malle 2021). While there has been limited work on how people attribute responsibility for violence, research into the public’s responses to poor government performance suggests that people can minimize the responsibility that they attribute to their preferred actors (Rudolph 2006; Bisgaard 2019). I thus hypothesize:

- *Responsibility Bias Hypothesis 1:* People are less likely to believe that the armed group as a whole is responsible for the violence when it is committed by their preferred group compared to when it is committed by an armed group they oppose.
- *Responsibility Bias Hypothesis 2:* The stronger an individual’s preferences are for an armed group, the larger the effect size hypothesized above will be.
- *Responsibility Bias Hypothesis 3:* People who believe that the armed group as a whole is responsible for the violence are more likely to believe that:
 - *a:* the violence is morally wrong
 - *b:* its perpetrators should be strongly punished

¹It is possible that people could justify violence by groups they support by characterizing the individual perpetrators as pressured to commit violence. While that may partially ameliorate the responsibility of the fighters, it would make the armed group guilty of not only violence against civilian but also coercion of its own fighters. This logic would not be an effective way to justify violence. Furthermore, foot soldiers have stronger incentives than leaders to attack civilians on average (e.g. Abrahms and Potter 2015).

Research Design

Case Selection

Colombia has been affected by conflict involving leftist rebel groups, paramilitary groups, and criminal organizations since the mid 1960s. The country serves as an excellent case to test the theory because it is deeply divided over the conflict, in which many civilians have been killed. Civilian targeting continues and remains highly salient today despite a 2016 peace agreement between the government and the largest rebel group, the FARC.

A 2013 report from the National Center of Historic Memory concludes that over 81 percent of the victims of the armed conflict, more than 177,000 people, were civilians. All armed groups engaged in a deliberate strategy of indiscriminate violence (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013). The abuses continued after this report was published and even after the peace agreement was signed in 2016. For example, social leaders have continued to be assassinated at alarming rates since the peace accord (Indepaz 2020; Espectador 2020). Furthermore, there were 91 massacres² perpetrated in 2020, causing the deaths of 381 people (Indepaz 2021). One important reason for continuing abuses is that the war didn't end with the 2016 peace agreement. The ELN didn't demobilize with the FARC in 2016, and there are also FARC fighters who did not demobilize or have remobilized since the peace agreement. These combatants are commonly referred to as dissidents of the FARC. In addition to guerrillas, the largest paramilitary group operating today, the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia, has several thousand fighters and a presence in more than two thirds of Colombia's departments (Casey and Jakes 2019; Posso, Palacios and Perafán 2020; Espectador 2021c; Posso et al. 2021). Even as these abuses of civilians continue, the country's history of violence against civilians plays a prominent role in national discourse. Transitional justice mechanisms, including trials and a truth and reconciliation commission, are ongoing and are prominently covered in news coverage (e.g. Institute 2019; Tiempo 2021; Transición

²Indepaz defines massacres as the intentional and simultaneous homicide of three or more people protected by international humanitarian law.

2021), as are hearings in international institutions concerning Colombian violence against civilians (e.g. *Espectador 2021a*).

Amidst this ongoing violence and continuing reckoning with past abuses, Colombians remain divided. For example, the Colombian public is very unsupportive of guerrilla groups; in 2018, less than 6 percent of all Colombians had confidence in the FARC, and fewer than a quarter of Colombians agreed that demobilized FARC fighters who were not commanders shouldn't have to go to jail if they confessed to their crimes (Dugand, García and Sánchez 2018). At the same time, supporters of the state are also divided over the conflict. The current president ran on a platform of modifying the peace agreement to ensure stricter punishment for FARC war criminals, and the founder of his political party, former President Uribe, has indicated that he would support a general amnesty in order to alleviate what he perceives as unfair punishment for paramilitaries and members of the armed forces (Grattan 2019; *Espectador 2021b*). In contrast, only 53 percent of Colombians had confidence in the armed forces in 2018 (Rivera, Plata Caviedes and Rodríguez Raga 2018), and less than a third of Colombians in 2018 agreed that demobilized members of the armed forces who were not commanders shouldn't have to go to jail if they confessed their crimes (Dugand, García and Sánchez 2018). Thus, not only is the country divided between guerrilla and state supporters, but it is also divided between state supporters with different attitudes toward the armed forces.

Experimental Procedure

Methodologically, this project consists of an online survey experiment in Colombia with 1,587 respondents, of whom 1,511 finished the survey. The survey was fielded by the firm Dynata.³ The design was approved by Duke University's IRB with protocol number 2021-0609, and the survey was fielded July 28th, 2021. All hypotheses were pre-registered

³Dynata recruited participants from their Colombian proprietary panel of respondents. The respondents from Dynata's pool who took this survey were randomly selected from among those Colombian respondents over the age of 18 who logged into the Dynata online system while the survey is being fielded. In order to continue to the survey, respondents had to consent and indicate that they were a Colombian citizen. Given the sensitive topic of the survey, respondents were able to skip any question.

in a pre-analysis plan.⁴ In the survey, respondents are first asked a series of demographic questions as well as two questions designed to discern their attitudes toward the Colombian military. They are then presented with a vignette concerning an instance of violence against civilians; this vignette randomly varies whether the violence was committed by the Colombian Armed Forces or by FARC dissidents. Respondents then answer a series of questions about the violence described in the vignette. The order of these follow-up questions is randomized, and each outcome measure is designed to examine one or more hypotheses. Lastly, respondents answer a series of questions about their broader political attitudes.

I assume that, on average, the sample supports the Armed Forces more than FARC dissidents or other leftist guerrillas. If the theory is correct, the sample should on average think that violence committed by the Armed Forces violence is less morally wrong and merits less punishment compared to guerrilla violence. This is a reasonable assumption given Colombian politics and the nature of online samples in the country. In 2018, less than 6 percent of all Colombians had confidence in the FARC (Dugand, García and Sánchez 2018). This public attitude is one explanation for the FARC's resounding electoral defeats in 2019, in their first elections since the peace accord (Anadolu 2019). Support for guerrillas is likely even lower within online survey samples because of limited internet penetration in rural areas, where the FARC have historically found support. 43 percent of Colombians have access to the internet (DANE 2018), but internet penetration in rural areas is less than 10 percent (Tiempo 2020). Thus, the sample for this experiment is likely to have far more supporters of the state than supporters of the guerrillas.

Nonetheless, respondents likely have varied attitudes toward the armed actors in the conflict; I thus operationalize individuals' armed group preference as their pro-military attitudes. To measure how pro-military respondents are, I ask two questions concerning respondents' security-related policy preferences. First, I ask them, on a scale of 1 to 5, "to what degree do you have confidence in the Armed Forces?" This question comes from

⁴The pre-analysis plan is available at <https://osf.io/myktb>.

LAPOP. Second, I ask respondents, “what should happen to the budget of the Ministry of Defense?” Response range from “it should be decreased a lot” (1) to “it should be increased a lot” (5). NAs are coded as 3. I then create an additive index from both questions which ranges from 2 to 10; this variable is then rescaled from 0-1 for ease in interpreting the interactions.⁵ This index will be referred to as **Pro-Military**. A 0 indicates a low level of support for the armed forces, and a 1 indicates a high level of support. In robustness checks, I also run the models with each of the two original questions on a 0-1 scale rather than with the index (Tables A7, A8). These questions about preference for the state were asked before treatment to ensure that the experiment did not affect responses.

Hypothetically, I could more directly operationalize “preference” for armed actors if I were able to measure both support for the armed forces and support for the guerrillas, subtracting one from the other. However, I do not ask respondents about their attitudes toward guerrillas because the country is still beset by violence and because civilian supporters of the FARC’s former political party were once violently targeted for supporting for the group (Steele 2017). Thus, it would be unethical to ask respondents whether they are more supportive of leftist guerrillas or the armed forces. It is also unlikely that respondents would provide an honest answer to such a question. Similarly, I chose not to use questions about ideology or vote choice because they are not precise enough; respondents could identify with an ideology or vote for a specific candidate for a wide range of reasons which are unrelated to their attitude toward the conflict. The two questions chosen instead provide a measure of the degree to which respondents are supportive of the state as an armed actor. Importantly, supporting decreasing the military budget or indicating a lack of confidence in the armed forces does not mark respondents as guerrilla supporters. Colombia is a multi-party state, and politicians regularly run on and express distinct perspectives on the armed forces (e.g.

⁵Note that this rescaling was not discussed in the pre-analysis plan. The change does not affect the substance of results. Additionally, in the pre-analysis plan, this index included an additional question in which I asked how much they agree with the statement that “the peace accord was necessary to end the conflict with the FARC-EP,” on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). This variable is now used in one of the extensions below which focuses on centrist attitudes.

Espectador 2019, 2021*a*). Additionally, Colombians feel comfortable expressing disapproval of the armed forces; from 2004 to 2018, 30 to 50 percent of all Colombians indicated that they did not have confidence in the armed forces (Rivera, Plata Caviedes and Rodríguez Raga 2018). Therefore, respondents can safely express their opinions on these topics, and the questions are sufficiently specific to capture attitudes toward the state as an armed actor.

Respondents next read a vignette simulating the first paragraph of a newspaper article about a recent instance of violence against civilians. The treatment is whether the violence was allegedly committed by the Colombian Armed Forces or FARC dissidents. The variable **Armed Forces Perp.** takes a value of 0 if FARC dissidents are the perpetrator and a value of 1 if the Colombian Armed Forces are the perpetrator. There are several design decisions to note about this vignette, which can be found below. First, the text references a massacre, a form of violence in which multiple civilians are killed at the same time. A wide variety of armed actors have engaged in such violence, making it plausible that either FARC dissidents or the Armed Forces were responsible (e.g. Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013; Castellanos 2020; Justicia 2021). However, in order to limit social desirability bias, the vignette does not use the term “massacre.” Second, the vignette is set in the *El Tiempo* newspaper; it is the largest newspaper in the country and is relatively centrist. Third, Antioquia was chosen as the site of the violence because it is plausible that a range of victims and perpetrators could be involved in violence there. 25 municipalities in Antioquia are a part of the Program for Territorially Focused Development (PDET), meaning they have been prioritized by the Colombian government after the peace accord because of their history of conflict. Since the peace agreement, FARC dissidents have been active in the department (JEP 2021*b*). At the same time, Antioquia includes a large city with a robust state presence in comparison to the countryside: Medellín. Additionally, a range of massacres have occurred in Antioquia over the past few years (Indepaz 2021). Fourth, the vignette features four deaths because that is the average number of victims of massacres in both 2020 and in 2021 through April 27, as identified by the Indepaz think tank (Indepaz 2021). While these details have been chosen

deliberately, the vignette says very little about the victims in order not to suggest a specific kind of perpetrator. For example, if the vignette noted that the victims were campesinos, respondents may infer that the violence occurred in a rural area in which non-state groups were fighting over territory. Last, the control condition is that FARC dissidents were the perpetrator. I did not include a control condition which did not name the perpetrator because it is likely that respondents would infer a perpetrator despite the vignette not naming one. The full text respondents see reads as follows:

Imagine a hypothetical article in the newspaper *El Tiempo*. After you read the first paragraph of the hypothetical article below, please answer several questions about the violence described in the article. Even if you are unsure of your answer, please do your best to respond.

“Four civilians, who were not fighting and were not a part of either a non-state armed group or the Colombian Armed Forces, were killed in Antioquia yesterday morning. According to initial reports, the victims were two men and two women; all were shot at close range. The local mayor alleges that the perpetrators were (*leftist dissidents of the FARC / members of the Colombian Armed Forces*).”

Respondents then answer a series of questions about the vignette, all of which are presented to them in a random order. Variable names precede the questions below, but respondents do not see these labels. Note that the range of punishments are based off possible punishments established in the peace accord. The exceptions are pardon and life imprisonment, which are more lenient and more harsh, respectively, than those included in the accord (Roccatello and Rojas 2020; JEP 2021a). Colombia does not allow the death penalty, so that is not included among the options. Note also that the phrasing in the **Responsibility** question refers to “the leaders of the organization” rather than to the “armed group as a whole,” as in the hypotheses. Given that leaders make the armed group’s policy and strategy, it is plausible to assert that the two are equivalent. But it is easier for respondents to understand what it means for leaders to be responsible than to understand what it means for an entire organization to be responsible. The full text of the relevant questions is below:

1. **Wrongfulness:** On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates “strongly disagree” and 5 indicates “strongly agree,” how much do you agree with the following statement: the violence described in the article above was morally wrong?
2. **Punishment:** What degree of punishment should the perpetrators of the violence described in the above article receive?
 - No punishment/pardon
 - 2 years of house arrest
 - 5 years of house arrest
 - 5 years of imprisonment
 - 15 years of imprisonment
 - Life imprisonment
3. **Necessary:** On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates “very unlikely” and 5 indicates “very likely,” how likely is it that the violence described in the article above was necessary to achieve military gains? Even if you are unsure of your answer, please do your best to respond.
4. **Severity:** Do you think that the number of victims of the violence described in the above article is very small, small, neither small nor large, large, or very large?
5. **Responsibility:** On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates “very unlikely” and 5 indicates “very likely,” how likely is it that the leadership of the organization that the perpetrators belonged to were responsible for the violence described in the article above? Even if you are unsure of your answer, please do your best to respond.

Following the experiment, the survey includes a range of other questions about the degree of confidence respondents have in the national government, their ideology, whether they had family victimized in conflict and by which armed group(s), the quality of municipal services, their security from assault or robbery in their neighborhood, their vote in the second round of the 2018 presidential election, and their opinion about which armed group was primarily responsible for the violence. Full question wording can be found in Appendix [H](#).

All regressions are OLS. **Armed Forces Perp.** takes a value of 0 if FARC dissidents are the perpetrator and a value of 1 if the Colombian Armed Forces are the perpetrator. Given that this is a randomized experiment and a balance table suggests that there are not significant demographic differences across individuals in the control and treatment group (Table [A10](#)), no control variables are used in the main analyses. Nonetheless, robustness test in Tables [A3](#) and [A4](#) indicate that the results are robust to including a range of control

variables. The survey includes one attention check: a reverse-coded question about the size of the area that the respondent lives in. The main analyses include those respondents who fail the attention check, though a robustness check indicates that the results are robust to excluding them (Tables A5 and A6). Table 1 summarizes how each hypothesis will be tested and provides a preview of whether the evidence supports each hypothesis.

Table 1: Operationalized Predictions

| Hypothesis | Dependent Variable | Independent Variable | Sign | Support |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|------|---------|
| Moral Wrongfulness Hypothesis 1 | Wrongfulness | Armed Forces Perp. | - | No |
| Moral Wrongfulness Hypothesis 2 | Wrongfulness | Armed Forces Perp. x Pro-Military | - | No |
| Punishment Hypothesis 1 | Punishment | Armed Forces Perp. | - | Yes |
| Punishment Hypothesis 2 | Punishment | Armed Forces Perp. x Pro-Military | - | Yes |
| Cause Bias Hypothesis 1 | Necessary | Armed Forces Perp. | + | No |
| Cause Bias Hypothesis 2 | Necessary | Armed Forces Perp.x Pro-Military | + | No |
| Cause Bias Hypothesis 3a | Wrongfulness | Necessary | - | Yes |
| Cause Bias Hypothesis 3b | Punishment | Necessary | - | No |
| Consequences Bias Hypothesis 1 | Severity | Armed Forces Perp. | - | No |
| Consequences Bias Hypothesis 2 | Severity | Armed Forces Perp. x Pro-Military | - | Yes |
| Consequences Bias Hypothesis 3a | Wrongfulness | Severity | + | Yes |
| Consequences Bias Hypothesis 3b | Punishment | Severity | + | Yes |
| Responsibility Bias Hypothesis 1 | Responsibility | Armed Forces Perp. | - | No |
| Responsibility Bias Hypothesis 2 | Responsibility | Armed Forces Perp. x Pro-Military | - | Yes |
| Responsibility Bias Hypothesis 3a | Wrongfulness | Responsibility | + | Yes |
| Responsibility Bias Hypothesis 3b | Punishment | Responsibility | + | Yes |


Results

The results visualized in Figures 1 through 4 suggest that perpetrator identity affects assessments of appropriate punishment for violence against civilians but not evaluations of the moral wrongness of civilian targeting. In other words, people think less harsh punishments are appropriate for their preferred armed actor, particularly when they are strongly supportive of the armed group, but they do not judge violence by their preferred group as less morally wrong. These findings suggest that evaluations of morality may follow a different logic than assessments of appropriate punishment. Regarding mechanisms, the results indicate that people characterize violence by their preferred perpetrators as less

severe and less likely to be the responsibility of the organization as a whole; the sizes of these effects depend on the strength of individuals' preference for one group over the other. Furthermore, less severe violence and violence which is not the responsibility of group leadership is characterized as less morally wrong and less deserving of punishment. This suggests that the *Consequences Hypotheses* and *Responsibility Hypotheses* are correct: people justify violence by their preferred armed groups by characterizing it as less harmful and less organized. In contrast, there is not a correlation between preference and characterizations of how militarily necessary the violence was, contradicting the *Cause Hypotheses*. Numerical results can be found in Tables A1 and A2. The results are robust to including controls (Tables A3 and A4), to removing people who failed the attention check (Table A5 and A6), and to using each of two the variables which make up the **Pro-Military** index rather than the index itself (Tables A7 and A8). It is important to note that the correlation between these two questions which make up the index is high: .42.

As the first panel of Figure 1 indicates, people are no more or less likely to judge violence as morally wrong when it is perpetrated by the government compared to when it is perpetrated by guerrillas. More technically, the relationship between **Armed Forces Perp** and **Wrongfulness** is not statistically significant. Because the interaction between **Armed Forces Perp.** and **Pro-Military** is similarly insignificant, this is true regardless of how intensely people prefer the state over the guerrillas or vice versa. In contrast, the second panel shows a negative and statistically significant correlation between **Armed Forces Perp.** and **Punishment**; this finding indicates that people believe that state perpetrators should be less harshly punished than guerrilla perpetrators. Furthermore, the interaction between **Armed Forces Perp.** and **Pro-Military** is negative in the regression about **Punishment**, as visualized in the third panel of Figure 1. This interaction suggests that strong supporters of the state have larger gaps in their punishment preferences between state and guerrilla perpetrators. Overall, these results do not provide support for the *Moral Wrongfulness Hypotheses* but do provide support for the *Punishment Hypotheses*.


Figure 1: Wrongfulness and Punishment



Note: No control variables are used in these regressions, and numeric results can be found in Table A1. The interaction visualized in panel 3 comes from model 4 in Table A1; the coefficients of this model are visualized in panel 2.

Next we will consider which of the three possible mechanisms discussed above could explain why people think their preferred armed actors deserve less harsh punishment (Figures 2, 3, and 4). As panel A of Figure 2 shows, the relationship between **Armed Forces Perp.** and **Necessary** is not statistically significant. Similarly, there is no significant interaction between **Pro-Military** and **Armed Forces Perp.** in evaluations of how **Necessary** the violence was. In other words, people do not characterize violence by their preferred armed group as more militarily necessary, regardless of how strong their preference is for that armed group. Panels B and D indicate that, while there is a substantively small negative correlation between estimates of how militarily **Necessary** the violence was and its moral **Wrongfulness**, there is no relationship between perceptions of military necessity (**Necessary**) and preferred severity of **Punishment** for the perpetrators. Overall, these results do not provide strong support for the *Cause Bias Hypotheses*; they suggest that people do not justify violence by their preferred group by evaluating it as more militarily necessary and less gratuitous, as suggested by Lyall, Blair and Kosuke (2013).

Figure 2: Cause




Note: No control variables are used in these regressions, and numeric results can be found in models 1-4 of Table A2.

In contrast, the evidence in Figure 3 suggests that people interpret the consequences of violence differently depending on the responsible armed group and, furthermore, that these altered evaluations of consequences shape differing perceptions of appropriate punishments for perpetrators. While the correlation between **Armed Forces Perp.** and **Severity** is not significant, as seen in panel A of Figure 3, the interaction between **Armed Forces Perp.** and **Pro-Military** is negative and statistically significant. This interaction is visualized in Panel C; it shows how, when people are strong supporters of the military, they characterize violence by the state as harming fewer people than when the same violence is committed by guerrillas. At lower levels of support for the state, the difference in the perceived severity of violence when it is perpetrated by state and guerrilla forces is smaller. This would explain why the correlation between **Armed Forces Perp.** and **Severity** is not statistically significant. It also suggests that there may be respondents who do not support the state more than the guerrillas, as was assumed in the design of the experiment. As panels B and D of Figure 3

suggest, when people see violence as more severe, they characterize it as more morally wrong and its perpetrators as more deserving of punishment. In summary, the results provide support for the *Consequence Hypotheses*; preferences for the state shape attitudes toward the severity of violence, which in turns shapes attitudes toward wrongfulness and punishment.

Figure 3: Consequences




Note: No control variables are used in these regressions, and numeric results can be found in models 5-8 of Table A2.

The findings shown in Figures 4 provides support for the *Responsibility Hypotheses*. There is no statistically significant correlation between **Armed Forces Perp.** and **Responsibility**, but the interaction between **Armed Forces Perp.** and **Pro-Military** is negative and statistically significant as well as substantively large. This interaction is visualized in panel C and indicates that people who strongly support the military characterize state violence as less likely to be the responsibility of armed group leaders compared to guerrilla violence. On the other hand, people with the weakest support for the state characterize state violence as more rather than less likely to be the responsibility of armed group leaders. This could why **Armed Forces Perp.** and **Responsibility** are not correlated: the portion of the sample

that doesn't prefer the state is too large. Furthermore, as panels B and D of Figure 4 indicate, higher levels of attribution of **Responsibility** to group leaders are correlated with increased perceptions of moral **Wrongfulness** and increased severity of desired **Punishment** for perpetrators. Overall, these results indicate that people see violence committed by their preferred armed group as less organized and systematic than violence committed by armed groups they oppose; violence which is not organized by group leadership is viewed as requiring less punishment and is seen as less morally wrong.

Figure 4: Responsibility



Note: No control variables are used in these regressions, and numeric results can be found in models 9-12 of Table A2.

Exploratory Analyses

Wrongfulness

Given that neither of the *wrongfulness hypotheses* are supported, it is important to consider what is shaping perceptions of moral wrongfulness, if not armed group preference. Indeed, the correlation between **Wrongfulness** and **Punishment** is only .08, although

these two variables should be highly correlated based on existing literature and the theory elucidated above. There are three possibilities: that different psychological processes govern beliefs about morality and punishment, that there is social desirability bias, and that other variables are driving attributions of wrongfulness. See section 5.2 for a discussion of why it is unlikely that social desirability bias affected responses.

As for the possibility that attributions of wrongfulness and blame are driven by distinct psychological processes, Cushman (2008) argues that evaluations of blame and punishment are sensitive to the harm that an individual causes, while judgements of wrongfulness are more sensitive to what an individual intends. Malle (2021) also argues that wrongness judgements are distinct from blame judgements. However, he posits that wrongness judgements are causally prior to blame judgements, making it unclear how blame could occur without judgement of moral wrongfulness. Unfortunately, this study is unable to test these psychological theories.

Regarding other variables shaping **Wrongfulness**, Table [A15](#) suggests that attitudes toward the peace accord shape beliefs about the moral **Wrongfulness** of the violence. It makes sense that individuals who believe that violence is a superior solution to the country's problems than a peace agreement see a specific act of violence as less unethical. Importantly, this suggests that understandings of the morality of violence could transcend attitudes toward specific armed groups, even if understandings of appropriate punishment do not. It could also be the case that many individuals who oppose the peace accord are extremely conservative, given that the far-right current president ran on a platform of modifying the agreement. If so, the finding aligns with existing research suggesting that conservative Americans and Israelis are more supportive of torture and the use of force involving civilian casualties than liberal ones (Wallace 2013; Sagan and Valentino 2017; Kearns and Young 2020; Bloom et al. 2020). A few other demographic and attitudinal variables also affect **Wrongfulness**.

Social Desirability

It is necessary to briefly discuss whether respondents were comfortable indicating that perpetrators of violence against civilians shouldn't be punished or that the violence was not morally wrong. I took several steps to limit social desirability bias in the design of the survey. First, questions integrated uncertainty in order to give respondents more cover to express their opinions. For example, respondents did not have to say with surety that the violence was militarily necessary; they could only indicate that it was "very likely" necessary. Additionally, several questions included the following language: "even if you are unsure of your answer, please do your best to respond." Second, the vignette did not include any graphic descriptions of violence. Nonetheless, there are two ways which social desirability bias could have affected the results: it could have prompted people to skip questions or to falsify their answers. However, a brief analysis of the data suggests that it is unlikely that either of these possibilities occurred to a significant degree.

Regarding missingness, the five dependent variables used in the analyses above have between 59 and 63 NAs each, out of 1,587 respondents. There were only 76 respondents who did not complete the survey, so most of these NAs come from dropoffs. Indeed, the correlation between NAs on various questions is extremely high (See Table [A11](#)). This suggests that there are not questions which make respondents particularly uncomfortable. However, there may be some kinds of respondents who are more unwilling to engage with the experiment writ large. Indeed, balance tables [A12](#) and [A13](#) suggest that demographics matter for who drops off. Higher income respondents are more likely to skip both the **Punishment** and **Necessary** questions. Additionally, more educated respondents are more likely to skip the **Punishment** question. However, they are no more likely to skip these questions if they have stronger **Pro-military** attitudes. Furthermore, respondents are not more likely to skip these two questions if they are in the **Armed Forces Perp.** treatment group or if they have been victimized in the conflict. Because victims could be more reluctant to answer questions which could make them recall their own victimization, and because people could be scared

of expressing their opinions about an armed group which is in control of their area, these two sets of nulls indicate that missingness is unlikely the result of varying levels of social desirability bias. Missingness is more likely the result of demographic differences between respondents.


Social desirability bias may also have prompted respondents to falsify their answers. However, the mean response to **Punishment** was a 5.347 out of 6, and the mean response to **Wrongfulness** was a 3.482 out of 5. In other words, the average respondent indicated that they neither agreed nor disagreed that the violence was morally wrong, and the average respondent supported a punishment of 15 years in prison for the perpetrators. 6 percent of respondents indicated that the perpetrators should receive no time in prison, and 24 percent of respondents indicated that disagreed that the violence was morally wrong. In other words, many respondents were clearly willing to express opinions about violence which might be considered distasteful.

Centrists

Thus far, I have operationalized armed group preference as pro-military attitudes. This implies that individuals who do not support the military are more likely to support leftist guerrillas. However, it is possible that there are individuals who dislike both the military and FARC dissidents. These individuals could be considered “centrists” and would not have a strong preference for either group, disliking both. In the Colombian context, where a center-right president negotiated the accord but a far-right president has criticized it, centrists would exhibit low levels of **Pro-Military** attitudes but high levels of support for the peace accord. Thus, I utilize a question which asks respondents, on a scale of 1 to 5, how much they agree that “the peace accord was necessary to end the conflict with the FARC-EP.” I dichotomize both **Pro-Military** and answers to this question, classifying respondents as **Center** if they have a value of less than .5 on the **Pro-Military** variable and a response of 4 or 5 on the question about how necessary the accord was. Centrists are approximately 30 percent of the sample. Importantly, the correlation between **Center** and

2018 vote choice, where 1 is a vote for the center-right dove and 0 is a vote for the far-right hawk, is high. .41, This correlation lends validity to the **Center** variable. I then rerun some of the main analyses, using the variable **Center** instead of **Pro-Military**. The results can be seen in Figure 5 and Table A14.

Figure 5: Wrongfulness and Punishment, Centrists



Note: No control variables are used in these regressions, and numeric results can be found in Table A14.

The results as visualized in Figure 5 suggest that centrists are more likely than the rest of the sample to say that violence is morally wrong, regardless of the perpetrator. More specifically, **Center** is statistically significant and positive, but the interaction between **Armed Forces Perp.** and **Center** is not statistically significant. This finding makes sense: if centrists don't support either armed actor, they will oppose violence regardless of who perpetrates it. Interestingly, centrists are no more or less likely to say that violence should be punished harshly, regardless of the perpetrator.

Conclusion

This study has examined the ways in which perpetrator identity shapes public responses to wartime violence against civilians. I have argued that people characterize violence by their preferred armed group as less morally wrong and deserving of less severe punishment. There are three possible mechanisms which may explain this. Depending on whether the

perpetrator is affiliated with their preferred armed group, people may differentially evaluate the causes of the violence, i.e. whether it is militarily necessary; the consequences of the violence, i.e. whether a lot of people were victimized; and who bears responsibility of the violence, i.e. whether the armed group as a whole bears responsibility. An online survey in Colombia which presents respondents with an instance of civilian targeting committed either by state armed forces or leftist guerrillas indicates that people justify lesser punishment for their preferred perpetrators by characterizing the violence as less severe and less organized but not as less militarily necessary. However, individuals' preferences are not correlated with their judgements about the moral wrongfulness of violence.

These results indicate that armed groups may be best able to persuade people to continue supporting them despite their violence against civilians by portraying the abuse as committed by rogue individuals within the organized or as harming relatively few civilians. On the other hand, portraying the abuse as necessary to win the war may not be convincing. Conversely, transitional justice institutions may be best able to convince civilian supporters of armed groups that punishment is necessary for its perpetrators by emphasizing the organized nature of the violence or the large numbers of victims. Further research should more directly examine how information or propoganda from armed groups, transitional justice institutions, and other actors about violence against civilians affects people's judgements about conflict-related abuse. Future research should also investigate why judgements of the moral wrongfulness of violence against civilians differ from assesments of appropriate punishments for perpetrators.

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Perpetrator Identity and Public Responses to Civilian Victimization

Supplementary Appendices

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A Main Results, Tables

Table A1: Main Results, Wrongfulness and Punishment

| | 1. Wrongfulness | 2. Wrongfulness | 3. Punishment | 4. Punishment |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Intercept | 3.45*** (0.05) | 3.37*** (0.08) | 5.43*** (0.04) | 5.42*** (0.07) |
| Armed Forces Perp. | 0.06 (0.06) | 0.09 (0.12) | -0.17** (0.05) | 0.04 (0.10) |
| Pro-Military | | 0.19 (0.18) | | 0.02 (0.15) |
| Pro-Military x Armed Forces Perp. | | -0.07 (0.25) | | -0.52* (0.21) |
| R ² | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Adj. R ² | -0.00 | -0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Num. obs. | 1527 | 1527 | 1527 | 1527 |
| RMSE | 1.27 | 1.27 | 1.06 | 1.06 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ° $p < 0.1$

Table A2: Main Results, Mechanisms

| | 1. Necessary | 2. Necessary | 3. Wrongfulness | 4. Punishment | 5. Severity | 6. Severity | 7. Wrongfulness | 8. Punishment | 9. Responsibility | 10. Responsibility | 11. Wrongfulness | 12. Punishment |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| (Intercept) | 2.72*** (0.05) | 2.60*** (0.09) | 3.70*** (0.07) | 5.41*** (0.06) | 3.72*** (0.04) | 3.67*** (0.08) | 2.89*** (0.11) | 4.89*** (0.09) | 3.58*** (0.04) | 3.11*** (0.08) | 2.96*** (0.10) | 4.89*** (0.09) |
| Armed Forces Perp. | 0.01 (0.07) | 0.09 (0.13) | | | -0.06 (0.06) | 0.13 (0.11) | | | -0.04 (0.06) | 0.55*** (0.11) | | |
| Pro-Military | | 0.30 (0.19) | | | | 0.11 (0.16) | | | | 1.18*** (0.16) | | |
| Armed Forces Perp. x Pro-Military | | -0.20 (0.26) | | | | -0.47* (0.22) | | | | -1.48*** (0.22) | | |
| Necessary | | | -0.08*** (0.02) | | | | | | | | | |
| Severity | | | | -0.02 (0.02) | | | 0.16*** (0.03) | 0.12*** (0.02) | | | | |
| Responsibility | | | | | | | | | | | 0.15*** (0.03) | 0.13*** (0.02) |
| R ² | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Adj. R ² | -0.00 | -0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.02 | -0.00 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Num. obs. | 1525 | 1525 | 1523 | 1523 | 1528 | 1528 | 1525 | 1525 | 1524 | 1524 | 1522 | 1522 |
| RMSE | 1.36 | 1.36 | 1.26 | 1.06 | 1.14 | 1.14 | 1.25 | 1.05 | 1.15 | 1.13 | 1.26 | 1.05 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ° $p < 0.1$

B Main Results with Control Variables

Table A3: Main Results with Controls, Wrongfulness and Punishment

| | 1. Wrongfulness | 2. Wrongfulness | 3. Punishment | 4. Punishment |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------|--------------------|
| (Intercept) | 11.94 [°] | 11.74 [°] | 16.27** | 19.48*** |
| | (6.37) | (6.55) | (5.25) | (5.37) |
| Armed Forces Perp. | 0.02 | 0.05 | -0.17** | 0.06 |
| | (0.07) | (0.12) | (0.06) | (0.10) |
| Gender | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.11* | 0.10 [°] |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Education | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.01 |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Age | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.01* | -0.01** |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Income | 0.02** | 0.02** | 0.02** | 0.02** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Rural | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.02 | -0.02 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| Victimized Gov | -0.13 | -0.13 | -0.17 | -0.21 [°] |
| | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.13) | (0.13) |
| Victimized Guerrilla | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Pro-Military | | 0.05 | | -0.04 |
| | | (0.19) | | (0.15) |
| Armed Forces Perp. x Pro-Military | | -0.08 | | -0.57** |
| | | (0.26) | | (0.21) |
| R ² | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.03 |
| Num. obs. | 1408 | 1408 | 1408 | 1408 |
| RMSE | 1.27 | 1.27 | 1.05 | 1.04 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [°] $p < 0.1$

Table A4: Main Results with Controls, Mechanisms

| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Necessary | Necessary | Wrongfulness | Punishment | Severity | Severity | Wrongfulness | Punishment | Responsibility | Responsibility | Wrongfulness | Punishment |
| (Intercept) | -9.03 (6.85) | -12.62 ^o (7.04) | 11.35 ^o (6.35) | 15.86 ^{**} (5.27) | 12.65 [*] (5.69) | 14.83 [*] (5.84) | 10.12 (6.32) | 14.46 ^{**} (5.22) | 8.55 (5.77) | 3.53 (5.83) | 12.05 ^o (6.33) | 14.66 ^{**} (5.23) |
| Armed Forces Perp. | 0.01 (0.07) | 0.09 (0.13) | | | -0.09 (0.06) | 0.08 (0.11) | | | -0.06 (0.06) | 0.50 ^{**} (0.11) | | |
| Gender | -0.14 ^o (0.07) | -0.13 ^o (0.07) | 0.07 (0.07) | 0.10 ^o (0.06) | 0.05 (0.06) | 0.04 (0.06) | 0.07 (0.07) | 0.10 ^o (0.06) | 0.07 (0.06) | 0.09 (0.06) | 0.07 (0.07) | 0.10 ^o (0.06) |
| Education | -0.01 (0.05) | -0.01 (0.05) | 0.01 (0.05) | -0.01 (0.04) | 0.06 (0.04) | 0.07 ^o (0.04) | -0.01 (0.05) | -0.02 (0.04) | 0.05 (0.04) | 0.06 (0.04) | -0.00 (0.05) | -0.01 (0.04) |
| Age ^e | 0.01 ^o (0.00) | 0.01 [*] (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.01 [*] (0.00) | -0.00 ^o (0.00) | -0.01 [*] (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 ^o (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) | -0.01 ^o (0.00) |
| Income | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.02 ^{**} (0.01) | 0.02 ^{**} (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | 0.01 ^o (0.01) | 0.02 ^{**} (0.01) | 0.02 ^{**} (0.01) | 0.02 ^{**} (0.01) | 0.01 ^o (0.01) | 0.02 ^{**} (0.01) | 0.02 ^{**} (0.01) |
| Rural | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.00 (0.03) | -0.00 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.03) | -0.02 (0.02) |
| Victimized Gov | 0.10 (0.17) | 0.14 (0.17) | -0.10 (0.15) | -0.15 (0.13) | 0.28 [*] (0.14) | 0.25 ^o (0.14) | -0.15 (0.15) | -0.18 (0.13) | -0.36 [*] (0.14) | -0.32 [*] (0.14) | -0.06 (0.15) | -0.10 (0.13) |
| Victimized Guerrilla | 0.19 ^o (0.10) | 0.17 (0.11) | 0.05 (0.10) | -0.01 (0.08) | 0.01 (0.09) | 0.02 (0.09) | 0.04 (0.10) | -0.01 (0.08) | 0.16 ^o (0.09) | 0.12 (0.09) | 0.02 (0.10) | -0.03 (0.08) |
| Intensity | | 0.41 [*] (0.20) | | | | | | | | 1.07 ^{**} (0.17) | | |
| Armed Forces Perp x Pro-Military | | -0.20 (0.28) | | | | | | | | -1.42 ^{**} (0.23) | | |
| Necessary | | | -0.08 ^{**} (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | | | | | | | | |
| Severity | | | | | | | 0.16 ^{**} (0.03) | 0.13 ^{**} (0.02) | | | 0.14 ^{**} (0.03) | 0.13 ^{**} (0.02) |
| Responsibility | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R ² | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.01 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Num. obs. | 1405 | 1405 | 1404 | 1404 | 1409 | 1409 | 1407 | 1407 | 1404 | 1404 | 1403 | 1403 |
| RMSE | 1.37 | 1.36 | 1.26 | 1.05 | 1.14 | 1.13 | 1.26 | 1.04 | 1.15 | 1.13 | 1.26 | 1.04 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ^o $p < 0.1$

C Main Results Removing Respondents Who Failed the Attention Check

Table A5: Excluding People Who Failed Attention Check, Wrongfulness and Punishment

| | 1. Wrongfulness | 2. Wrongfulness | 3. Punishment | 4. Punishment |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|
| Intercept | 3.47*** (0.05) | 3.41*** (0.09) | 5.45*** (0.04) | 5.49*** (0.08) |
| Armed Forces Perp. | 0.06 (0.07) | 0.12 (0.13) | -0.17** (0.06) | 0.01 (0.11) |
| Pro-Military | | 0.16 (0.19) | | -0.09 (0.16) |
| Armed Forces Perp. x Pro-Military | | -0.16 (0.27) | | -0.42 ^o (0.22) |
| R ² | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| Adj. R ² | -0.00 | -0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Num. obs. | 1278 | 1278 | 1278 | 1278 |
| RMSE | 1.27 | 1.27 | 1.04 | 1.04 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ^o $p < 0.1$

Table A6: Excluding People Who Failed Attention Check, Mechanisms

| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Necessary | Necessary | Wrongfulness | Punishment | Severity | Severity | Wrongfulness | Punishment | Responsibility | Responsibility | Wrongfulness | Punishment |
| (Intercept) | 2.72*** (0.05) | 2.62*** (0.10) | 3.72*** (0.08) | 5.44*** (0.07) | 3.74*** (0.04) | 3.73*** (0.08) | 2.73*** (0.12) | 4.95*** (0.10) | 3.58*** (0.05) | 3.14*** (0.08) | 2.93*** (0.11) | 4.97*** (0.10) |
| Armed Forces Perp. | -0.02 (0.08) | 0.04 (0.14) | | | -0.05 (0.06) | 0.14 (0.11) | | | -0.01 (0.06) | 0.63*** (0.12) | | |
| Pro-Military | | 0.24 (0.21) | | | | 0.03 (0.17) | | | | 1.11*** (0.17) | | |
| Armed Forces Perp. x Pro-Military | | -0.16 (0.29) | | | | -0.46 ^o (0.24) | | | | -1.59*** (0.24) | | |
| Necessary | | | -0.08** (0.03) | -0.03 (0.02) | | | | | | | | |
| Severity | | | | | | | 0.21*** (0.03) | 0.11*** (0.03) | | | 0.16*** (0.03) | 0.11*** (0.03) |
| Responsibility | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| R ² | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| Adj. R ² | -0.00 | -0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.01 | -0.00 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| Num. obs. | 1277 | 1277 | 1276 | 1276 | 1278 | 1278 | 1277 | 1277 | 1276 | 1276 | 1275 | 1275 |
| RMSE | 1.36 | 1.36 | 1.26 | 1.05 | 1.12 | 1.12 | 1.24 | 1.03 | 1.15 | 1.13 | 1.25 | 1.04 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ^o $p < 0.1$

D Components of “Pro-Military” Index

Table A7: Confidence in the Military Instead of Preference Intensity

| | 1. Wrongfulness | 2. Punishment | 3. Necessary | 4. Severity | 5. Responsibility |
|---|-----------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------|
| (Intercept) | 3.46*** | 5.42*** | 2.62*** | 3.67*** | 3.13*** |
| | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Armed Forces Perp. | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 0.50*** |
| | (0.12) | (0.10) | (0.13) | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Confidence in Military | -0.02 | 0.02 | 0.21 | 0.10 | 0.91*** |
| | (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.15) | (0.13) | (0.13) |
| Armed Forces Perp. x Confidence in Military | 0.12 | -0.39* | -0.11 | -0.35* | -1.10*** |
| | (0.20) | (0.17) | (0.21) | (0.18) | (0.18) |
| R ² | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.03 |
| Adj. R ² | -0.00 | 0.01 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.03 |
| Num. obs. | 1527 | 1527 | 1525 | 1528 | 1524 |
| RMSE | 1.27 | 1.06 | 1.36 | 1.14 | 1.14 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ° $p < 0.1$

Table A8: Military Budget Increase Instead of Preference Intensity

| | 1. Wrongfulness | 2. Punishment | 3. Necessary | 4. Severity | 5. Responsibility |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------|
| (Intercept) | 3.35*** | 5.43*** | 2.65*** | 3.70*** | 3.34*** |
| | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.06) |
| Armed Forces Perp. | 0.14 | -0.06 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.26** |
| | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.08) | (0.09) |
| Budget Increase | 0.32* | 0.00 | 0.23 | 0.05 | 0.77*** |
| | (0.16) | (0.13) | (0.17) | (0.14) | (0.14) |
| Armed Forces Perp. x Budget Increase | -0.27 | -0.34° | -0.17 | -0.30 | -1.00*** |
| | (0.22) | (0.18) | (0.24) | (0.20) | (0.20) |
| R ² | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.00 | 0.01 | -0.00 | 0.00 | 0.02 |
| Num. obs. | 1527 | 1527 | 1525 | 1528 | 1524 |
| RMSE | 1.27 | 1.06 | 1.36 | 1.14 | 1.14 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ° $p < 0.1$

E Data

Table A9: Descriptive Statistics

| Statistic | N (1,587 total) | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Pctl(25) | Pctl(75) | Max |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Year Born | 1,504 | 1,987.862 | 11.276 | 1,945.000 | 1,981.000 | 1,997.000 | 2,011.000 |
| Woman (1/2) | 1,538 | 1.501 | 0.500 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 2.000 | 2.000 |
| Education (0-4) | 1,553 | 3.199 | 0.827 | 0.000 | 3.000 | 4.000 | 4.000 |
| Income (0-16) | 1,497 | 10.656 | 4.937 | 0.000 | 8.000 | 15.000 | 16.000 |
| Rural (1-5) | 1,552 | 3.538 | 1.275 | 1.000 | 3.000 | 5.000 | 5.000 |
| Accord Unnecessary (0-1) | 1,587 | 0.405 | 0.317 | 0.000 | 0.250 | 0.500 | 1.000 |
| Confidence Military (0-1) | 1,587 | 0.486 | 0.323 | 0.000 | 0.250 | 0.750 | 1.000 |
| Budget Ministry of Defense (0-1) | 1,587 | 0.315 | 0.294 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.500 | 1.000 |
| Pro-Military (0-1) | 1,587 | 0.401 | 0.260 | 0.000 | 0.250 | 0.625 | 1.000 |
| Wrongfulness (1-5) | 1,527 | 3.482 | 1.267 | 1.000 | 3.000 | 5.000 | 5.000 |
| Punishment (1-6) | 1,527 | 5.347 | 1.063 | 1.000 | 5.000 | 6.000 | 6.000 |
| Necessary (1-5) | 1,525 | 2.724 | 1.360 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 4.000 | 5.000 |
| Severity (1-5) | 1,528 | 3.688 | 1.138 | 1.000 | 3.000 | 5.000 | 5.000 |
| Responsibility (1-5) | 1,524 | 3.554 | 1.155 | 1.000 | 3.000 | 4.000 | 5.000 |
| Ideology (1-10) | 1,505 | 5.439 | 2.310 | 1.000 | 4.000 | 6.000 | 10.000 |
| Victimized (0/1) | 1,437 | 0.315 | 0.465 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Victimized by Government (0/1) | 1,587 | 0.054 | 0.225 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Victimized by Guerrilla (0/1) | 1,587 | 0.141 | 0.348 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

Table A10: Balance Table, Treatment

| Variable | Treatment=0 | Treatment =1 | Difference |
|------------|----------------|--------------|------------|
| | Guerrilla Perp | State Perp | |
| Education | 3.21 | 3.19 | -.02 |
| Woman | 1.49 | 1.51 | .02 |
| Income | 10.5 | 10.8 | .30 |
| Rural | 3.52 | 3.55 | .03 |
| Victimized | .303 | .327 | .024 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ° $p < 0.1$

Table A11: Correlation between Missingness in Dependent Variables

| | Wrongfulness NA | Punishment NA | Necessary NA | Severity NA | Responsibility NA |
|-------------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------|
| Wrongfulness NA | 1 | 0.965 | 0.949 | 0.956 | 0.941 |
| Punishment NA | 0.965 | 1 | 0.949 | 0.956 | 0.941 |
| Necessary NA | 0.949 | 0.949 | 1 | 0.957 | 0.942 |
| Severity NA | 0.956 | 0.956 | 0.957 | 1 | 0.949 |
| Responsibility NA | 0.941 | 0.941 | 0.942 | 0.949 | 1 |

Table A12: Balance Table, Punishment Missingness

| Variable | Not NA | NA | Difference |
|--------------------|--------|------|------------|
| Education | 2.87 | 3.21 | .34* |
| Woman | 1.63 | 1.50 | -.13 |
| Income | 8.42 | 10.7 | 2.28* |
| Rural | 3.27 | 3.54 | .27 |
| Victimized | .5 | .315 | .185 |
| Pro-Military | .421 | .400 | -.021 |
| Armed Forces Perp. | .533 | .506 | -.027 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $^{\circ}p < 0.1$

Table A13: Balance Table, Necessary Missingness

| Variable | Not NA | NA | Difference |
|--------------------|--------|------|------------|
| Education | 2.91 | 3.21 | .3 |
| Woman | 1.55 | 1.50 | -.05 |
| Income | 8.18 | 10.7 | 2.52* |
| Rural | 3.18 | 3.54 | .36 |
| Victimized | .667 | .315 | -.352 |
| Pro-Military | .409 | .400 | -.009 |
| Armed Forces Perp. | .532 | .506 | -.026 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $^{\circ}p < 0.1$

F Exploratory Analysis: Centrists

Table A14: Replace Pro-Military with Centrist

| | Wrongfulness | Punishments |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Intercept | 3.37*** (0.06) | 5.43*** (0.05) |
| Armed Forces Perp. | 0.09 (0.08) | -0.22*** (0.07) |
| Center | 0.25* (0.10) | 0.02 (0.08) |
| Center x Armed Forces Perp. | -0.08 (0.14) | 0.16 (0.12) |
| R ² | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| Num. obs. | 1525 | 1525 |
| RMSE | 1.26 | 1.06 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $^{\circ}p < 0.1$

G Exploratory Analysis: Wrongfulness

Table A15: Determinants of Wrongfulness

| | Wrongfulness | Wrongfulness |
|----------------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| (Intercept) | 15.85* | 16.74* |
| | (6.56) | (6.74) |
| Armed Forces Perp. | 0.04 | 0.10 |
| | (0.07) | (0.12) |
| Gender | 0.14* | 0.14* |
| | (0.07) | (0.07) |
| Education | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | (0.05) | (0.05) |
| Age | -0.01* | -0.01* |
| | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Income | 0.02** | 0.02** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) |
| Rural | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Victimized Gov | -0.16 | -0.17 |
| | (0.15) | (0.16) |
| Victimized Guerrilla | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| | (0.10) | (0.10) |
| Vote 2018 | -0.10 | -0.10 |
| | (0.08) | (0.08) |
| Municipal Services | 0.08* | 0.09* |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Security | 0.07 | 0.07 |
| | (0.04) | (0.04) |
| Accord Necessary | 0.13*** | 0.12*** |
| | (0.03) | (0.03) |
| Pro-Military | | -0.02 |
| | | (0.19) |
| Armed Forces Perp x Pro-Military | | -0.15 |
| | | (0.26) |
| R ² | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Num. obs. | 1384 | 1384 |
| RMSE | 1.25 | 1.26 |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, ° $p < 0.1$

H Full Survey Text, English

- In what year were you born?
- What is your gender?
 1. Male
 2. Female
 3. Other gender
 99. Prefer not to answer
- In what municipality were you born (e.g. Cali)?
- In what municipality do you live (e.g. Medellín)
- What is the highest level of education you have finished?
 0. None
 1. Primary school
 2. Secondary school
 3. Associate degree
 4. University
- Can you tell me in which of these ranges is your monthly household income, including remittances from abroad and the income of all adults and children who work?
 0. No income
 1. Less than 205.000
 2. Between 205.001 and 325.000
 3. Between 325.001 and 440.000
 4. Between 440.001 and 565.000
 5. Between 565.001 and 650.000
 6. Between 650.001 and 710.000
 7. Between 710.001 and 750.000
 8. Between 750.001 and 810.000
 9. Between 810.001 and 915.000
 10. Between 915.001 and 1.000.000
 11. Between 1.000.001 and 1.250.000
 12. Between 1.250.001 and 1.365.000
 13. Between 1.365.001 and 1.600.000
 14. Between 1.600.001 and 2.000.000
 15. Between 2.000.001 and 3.150.000
 16. More than 3.150.000
 98. Inapplicable (no work or retired)

- What best describes the area in which you live?
 1. Rural area
 2. Small city
 3. Mid-sized city
 4. Large city
 5. National Capital (metropolitan area)
- On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates strongly disagree and 5 indicates strongly agree, how much do you agree with the following statement: the peace accord was necessary to end the conflict with the FARC-EP?

| | | | | |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|-------------------|
| 1. Strongly disagree | 2. Disagree | 3. Neither agree nor disagree | 4. Agree | 5. Strongly Agree |
| | | | | |

- On this page we have a scale that goes from 1 to 5, where 1 is the lowest and signifies none and 5 is the highest and signifies a lot. To what degree do you have confidence in the Armed Forces?

| | | | | |
|---------|----|----|----|----------|
| 1. None | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. A lot |
| | | | | |

- What should happen to the budget of the Ministry of Defense?
 1. It should be decreased a lot
 2. It should be decreased a little
 3. It should stay the same
 4. It should be increased a little
 5. It should be increased a lot

Imagine a hypothetical article in the newspaper El Tiempo. Please read the first paragraph of the hypothetical article below, and then please answer several questions about the violence described in the article. Even if you are unsure of your answer, please do your best to respond.

Four civilians, who were not fighting and were not a part of either a non-state armed group or the Colombian Armed Forces, were killed in Antioquia yesterday morning. According to initial reports, the victims were two men and two women; all were shot at close range. The local mayor alleges that the perpetrators were (*leftist dissidents of the FARC / members of the Colombian Armed Forces*).

| | | | | |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|-------------------|
| 1. Strongly disagree | 2. Disagree | 3. Neither agree nor disagree | 4. Agree | 5. Strongly Agree |
| | | | | |

- On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates strongly disagree and 5 indicates strongly agree, how much do you agree with the following statement: the violence described in the article above was morally wrong?
- What degree of punishment should the perpetrators of the violence described in the above article receive?

1. No punishment/pardon
2. 2 years of house arrest
3. 5 years of house arrest
4. 5 years of imprisonment
5. 15 years of imprisonment
6. Life imprisonment

- On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates very unlikely and 5 indicates very likely, how likely is it that the violence described in the article above was necessary to achieve military gains? Even if you are unsure of your answer, please do your best to respond.

| | | | | |
|------------------|-------------|--------------------------------|-----------|----------------|
| 1. Very unlikely | 2. Unlikely | 3. Neither likely nor unlikely | 4. Likely | 5. Very likely |
| | | | | |

- Do you think that the number of victims of the violence described in the above article is very small, small, neither small nor large, large, or very large?

- Very small
- Small
- Neither small nor large
- Large
- Very large

- On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates very unlikely and 5 indicates very likely, how likely is it that the leadership of the organization that the perpetrators belonged to were responsible for the violence described in the article above? Even if you are unsure of your answer, please do your best to respond.

| | | | | |
|------------------|-------------|--------------------------------|-----------|----------------|
| 1. Very unlikely | 2. Unlikely | 3. Neither likely nor unlikely | 4. Likely | 5. Very likely |
| | | | | |

- On this page we have a scale that goes from 1 to 5, where 1 is the lowest and signifies none and 5 is the highest and signifies a lot. To what degree do you have confidence in the National Government?

| | | | | |
|---------|----|----|----|----------|
| 1. None | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. A lot |
| | | | | |

- On this page we have a scale from 1 to 10 that goes from left to right, in which 1 signifies left and 10 signifies right. Today when we talk about political tendency, many people talk about those that sympathize more with the left or the right. According to the meaning that the terms left and right have for you when you think about your political point of view, where would you place yourself on this scale?

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------|
| 1 Left | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 Right |
| | | | | | | | | | |

- Have you lost a family member or close relative as a consequence of the armed conflict, or do you have a relative who was disappeared in the conflict?

- No
- Yes

99. Prefer not to answer

if yes, proceed to following question; if not, skip

- Which type of actor or actors were responsible? Indicate all that apply.

1. Guerrillas
2. Paramilitaries
3. BACRIM (criminal bands)
4. The army
5. The police
6. Other

98. Don't know

99. Prefer not to answer

- Would you say that the services the municipality is giving to the people are?

| | | | | |
|------------------------|--------|--|-----------|-----------------|
| 1. Very bad (awful) | 2. Bad | 3. Neither good nor bad (regular) | 4. (Good) | 5. Very good |
| | | | | |

- Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live and thinking about the possibility of being a victim of assault or robbery, do you feel very insecure, somewhat insecure, somewhat secure, or very secure?

| | | | |
|---------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Very insecure | 2. Somewhat insecure | 3. Somewhat secure | 4. Very secure |
| | | | |

- Did you vote in the second round of presidential elections in June of 2018?

0. No

1. Yes

99. Prefer not to Answer

if yes, proceed to following question; if not, skip

- Who did you vote for?

1. Iván Duque

2. Gustavo Petro

99. Prefer not to answer

- In your opinion, which is the principal actor responsible for the violence youve lived through in Colombia?

1. Guerrillas
2. Paramilitaries
3. BACRIM (criminal bands)
4. The army
5. The police
6. Other
7. All

99. Prefer not to answer

- What best describes the area in which you live?

5. National Capital (metropolitan area)
4. Large city
3. Mid-sized city
2. Small city
1. Rural area

- Imagine that *(no new information emerged about the false positives / the JEP found that former President Uribe ordered the false positives, but he continued to deny involvement / the JEP found that former President Uribe ordered the false positives, and he apologized for his involvement)*. What degree of punishment do you think former President Uribe should receive for the false positives?

1. No punishment/pardon
2. 2 years of house arrest
3. 5 years of house arrest
4. 5 years of imprisonment
5. 15 years of imprisonment
6. Life imprisonment