

Doves, Hawks, and Turnout: The Electoral Effects of Targeted Post-Conflict Political Violence

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Abstract

What are the effects of violence against civic leaders and ex-combatants on electoral outcomes in unstable contexts emerging from conflict? Such individuals have been targeted in a range of countries, including Colombia and Afghanistan. Yet, existing research on wartime and electoral violence has rarely explored the killings of these non-combatants, who are neither regular people nor powerful politicians. Thus, we examine the relationship between 1) the deaths of social leaders and demobilized ex-combatants in Colombia following the 2016 peace agreement and 2) Colombian political participation and vote choice in 2018 and 2019 elections. Methodologically, we use a series of municipal level estimations followed by individual level regressions using DANE survey data from the Colombian government. Our results indicate that social leader and ex-combatant assassinations each reduce political engagement as well as support for the hawkish candidate. We also provide suggestive evidence that the assassinations not only reduce citizens' perceptions of their personal security but also increase their belief in the value of violence and depress their satisfaction with the state of democracy in their country. These results suggest that, through their impact on electoral participation, vote choice, and public attitudes, the assassinations may have countervailing effects on national stability.

1 Introduction

What are the effects of violence against civic leaders and ex-combatants on electoral outcomes in unstable contexts emerging from conflict? We know a great deal about electoral responses to violence perpetrated against civilians during conflict (e.g. Berrebi and Klor, 2008; Balcells, 2012; Daly, 2019), as well as about violence committed in advance of elections against political figures (e.g. Ley, 2018) and voters (e.g. Condra et al., 2018; Gutiérrez-Romero and LeBas, 2020). However, little research has been conducted on the targeting of either civil society leaders or ex-combatants. These individuals are not accused of directly aiding armed groups, as in the case of wartime selective violence (Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood, 2017). Furthermore, violence against civic leaders and ex-combatants doesn't directly threaten a significant portion of the population, unlike voter intimidation, collective civilian targeting, and indiscriminate civilian targeting (Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood, 2017; Balcells and Stanton, 2021; Birch et al., 2020). While it doesn't directly target regular people, violence against political candidates implicitly threatens anyone who is considering voting for them (Ley, 2018). Therefore, unlike in these other cases of violence against non-combatants who are regular people or politicians, it is unclear how the assassinations of civic leaders and/or ex-combatants would affect electoral outcomes.

Yet, such deaths have occurred around the world. In Colombia, between the signing of the peace agreement in 2016 and November 25th of 2020, more than 249 demobilized members of the FARC were assassinated; another 272 reported threats made against them (JEP, 2020). Similarly, between the signing of the peace agreement and August of 2020, 1000 social leaders were killed (Indepaz, 2020a). In 2020 alone, 310 leaders were killed (Indepaz, 2020b). These leaders play roles in unions, indigenous communities, campesino groups, environmental organizations, and more. This phenomenon is not confined to Colombia. In fact, one NGO identified 331 human rights defenders who were killed in 2020 in a range of countries with a recent history of conflict, including Afghanistan, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Libya, and Syria (Defenders, 2021). For example, during the ongoing peace negotiations in

Afghanistan between the Taliban and the government, there has been a wave of unclaimed assassination of social leaders and former or off-duty security forces (Abed and Gibbons-Neft, 2021). If elections are a crucial element of recovery from conflict, as many argue (Lyons, 2004; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Call, 2012), then it is important for long-term stability to address the effects of continuing violence on the democratic process.

We build on a range of related literatures with contradictory conclusions in order to theorize about the possible effects of violence against social leaders and ex-combatants on electoral outcomes. Research on electoral violence suggests that violence will lower turnout (e.g. Ley, 2018; Condra et al., 2018); work on violence committed by non-state groups indicates that it may affect whether people vote for hawks or doves in elections in which all candidates are affiliated with the government (e.g. Berrebi and Klor, 2008; Weintraub et al., 2015); and research into wartime violence against civilians suggests that violence will cause voters to turn away from perpetrator-affiliated candidates (e.g. de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2013; Heger, 2015). These three literatures can each shed light on the deaths of civil society leaders and demobilized combatants because they all focus on violence perpetrated against individuals who are not members of armed groups.

In the Colombian context, literature on electoral violence would predict that exposure to assassinations would decrease turnout in the 2018 runoff election between Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro. In contrast, because both candidates were affiliated with the government and because the most common explanation for the deaths is competition between non-state groups, research into violence against civilians would suggest that turnout should increase in areas with assassinations. Lastly, given that Duque is a hawk and Petro a dove, literature on the effect of insurgent violence on the election of government-affiliated figures would predict that voters exposed to the violence occurred would be more likely to prefer one candidate over the other. As such, existing research predicts that people would vote for different candidates, turnout would increase, and turnout would decrease in areas where demobilized combatants and social leaders have been killed when compared to those areas in which there

have not been assassinations.

In light of these different predictions, we examine the relationship between 1) deaths of social leaders and demobilized ex-combatants in Colombia following the 2016 peace agreement and 2) 2018 and 2019 presidential turnout and vote choice. We conduct analyses at both the municipal and the individual level. We find that the killing of social leaders and former combatants depresses electoral political engagement. In municipalities in which combatants have been killed, turnout is reduced and, among those who head to the polls, voters are more likely to vote blank or null rather than vote for a specific candidate. Furthermore, voters in municipalities in which social leaders and ex-combatants have been killed are less likely to vote for Duque in the 2018 presidential runoff. Using DANE survey data, we provide suggestive evidence that voters exposed to such violence not only feel more insecure but also have less confidence in Colombian democracy and are more supportive of violence. Overall, our results suggest that we must consider a broader spectrum of violence against civilians, incorporating not only regular people and politicians but also people who have moderate levels of social capita.

2 The Effect of Assassinations on Electoral Outcomes

Three relevant literatures speak to the question of how violence against demobilized combatants and social leaders impacts election outcomes. Firstly, research into electoral violence suggests that the deaths will reduce turnout; the effect may be particularly pronounced in more leftist areas. Secondly, literature on insurgent violence is inconclusive about whether the assassinations will lead to increased or decreased support for dovish candidates and policies. Lastly, work on violence against civilians suggests that the violence will prompt depressed support for candidates affiliated with the perpetrators. Because demobilized combatants are perceived so negatively, it is also possible that only social leader deaths prompt decreased support for perpetrator-affiliated candidates whereas ex-combatant deaths actu-

ally prompt increased support for perpetrator-affiliated candidates.

2.1 Electoral Violence

Electoral violence, while varied in form, “is levied by political actors to purposefully influence the process and outcome of elections, and it involves coercive acts against humans, property, and infrastructure” (Birch et al., 2020, p. 4). Studies in a wide range of countries indicate that electoral violence decreases turnout. For example, in a study of cartel violence in Mexico, Ley (2018) finds that violent attacks by organized crime against public authorities and party candidates depressed turnout. Ley argues that such violence reduces the perceived benefits of and satisfaction derived from voting while also increasing the costs and risks associated with doing so. Research into violence in Colombia and Mexico similarly suggests that targeting of local authorities and political leaders can reduce the number of candidates who run for office (Arjona and Chacón, 2013; Ponce, 2019). Electoral violence can also target regular voters, reducing turnout through intimidation (Collier and Vicente, 2014; Gallego, 2018a; Gutiérrez-Romero and LeBas, 2020; Condra et al., 2018). As such, if the assassinations of social leaders and former combatants are conceived as violence more closely tied to the coming elections than to the conflict, the deaths should depress turnout in affected municipalities.

- *Electoral Violence Hypothesis 1:* Voters in municipalities in which social leaders and former combatants have been killed will be less likely to turn out to vote.

While most of the literature on electoral violence conceives of the phenomenon as an attempt to influence the outcome of future elections, people can also be victimized because of how they voted in previous elections. In this form of collective targeting, people are victimized because of their ideology or their presumed ideology (Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood, 2017). For example, in the Colombian case, many communities were targeted by paramilitary groups when they revealed themselves as left-leaning by supporting the FARC’s former

political party, the UP (Steele, 2017). Indeed, the election of other left-wing parties in the early 1990s which had previously been excluded from politics resulted in an increase in violence perpetrated by right-wing paramilitaries in Colombia (Fergusson et al., 2021). While the targeting of left-leaning social leaders is distinct from the targeting of entire communities for their ideology, it is possible that the assassination of social leaders only affects turnout in leftist areas because it is in those areas where the deaths of individuals threaten or foreshadow violence against the community writ large. Thus, an alternative hypothesis is as follows:

- *Electoral Violence Hypothesis 2:* Voters in left-leaning municipalities in which social leaders and former combatants have been killed will be less likely to turn out to vote when compared to voters in right-leaning municipalities in which social leaders and former combatants have been killed.

2.2 Insurgent Violence, Doves, and Hawks

The previously summarized literature on electoral violence focuses on violence which occurs in unstable but at peace contexts. However, there are two other literatures which theorize about the effect of wartime violence against non-combatants on elections: the first focuses on insurgent violence and the election of various government-affiliated figures, and the second focuses on violence against civilians and the election of perpetrator-affiliated candidates. The first set of research primarily conceives of elections as occurring between candidates who all support the government but who have different attitudes toward non-state insurgent groups, whereas the second conceives of elections as occurring between government-affiliated and rebel-affiliated candidates.

Some studies identify a correlation between exposure to insurgent violence and support for pro-peace dovish candidates and concessionary policies. For example, Weintraub et al. (2015) find, in the case of the 2014 Colombian elections, an inverted-U shaped relationship between prior insurgent violence and vote share for the pro-peace candidate. In other words, the pro-peace presidential candidate received more votes in communities with moderate

levels of violence but performed poorly in areas with either high or low levels of violence. Gould and Klor (2010) identify a similar inverted U-shaped relationship between attacks and support for concessions. Lastly, Tellez (2019) concludes, in a study of support for the Colombian peace process, that civilians in conflict areas are more supportive of the peace process and are more willing to grant concessions to non-state groups. In contrast, a range of other studies conclude that non-state violence prompts voters to support more hawkish political parties and policies rather than dovish ones. For example, Berrebi and Klor (2008) and Kibris (2011) find that local terror attacks increase the support for right-wing parties in Israel and Turkey who are less concessionist. Furthermore, Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014) find that this relationship remains true for the mere threat of terror. More specifically, they find that Israeli localities which are within the range of rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip are more likely to vote for right-wing candidates. Given that there have not been enough municipalities affected by leader and demobilized combatant deaths in Colombia to examine a U-shaped relationship, this literature suggests two diametrically opposite hypotheses:¹

- *Hawk-Dove Hypothesis 1*: Voters in municipalities in which former combatants and social leaders have been killed will be more likely to vote for dovish candidates.
- *Hawk-Dove Hypothesis 2*: Voters in municipalities in which former combatants and social leaders have been killed will be more likely to vote for hawkish candidates.

2.3 Violence against Civilians, Candidates Affiliated with Armed Groups

While the literature discussed in the prior section presumes that it is non-state armed groups who are perpetrating violence and shaping votes for various government-affiliated

¹Insurgent violence may also harm incumbents by suggesting to voters that the current government is incompetent and unable to secure the safety of its citizens (Gassebner et al., 2008; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2010; Kibris, 2011; Birnir and Gohdes, 2018). However, for reasons discussed below, neither candidate in the second round of the 2018 Colombian presidential election could clearly be considered the incumbent.

figures, another literature considers the impact of violence against civilians on the electoral fortunes of political actors affiliated with whichever armed groups have engaged in civilian targeting. In this literature, elections occur not between hawks and doves but rather between candidates affiliated with different groups participating in the conflict. Yet the independent variable in these two literatures is startlingly similar. In fact, several papers discussed above on insurgent violence directly measure what could be called violence against civilians. For example, Berrebi and Klor (2008) and Gould and Klor (2010) directly examine the number of noncombatant fatalities from terror attacks.

Several studies on violence against civilians suggest that armed groups suffer electorally for such violence. For example, de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca (2013) find that Basque Country voters punish the ETA's political party, Batasuna, for violence it commits against non-nationalist politicians. Altier (2019) concludes that sectarian state violence against Catholic civilians in Northern Ireland leads to increased support for Sinn Féin, the Provisional Irish Republican Army's political party. Heger (2015) argues that insurgents are less likely to attack civilians when participating in elections because such violence alienates supporters. Lastly, Balcells (2012) finds that victimization lead to the rejection of perpetrators following conflict, including electorally, along cleavages that were salient during the conflict. Thus, we hypothesize the following:

- *Armed-Group Affiliated Candidates Hypothesis 1:* Voters in municipalities in which former combatants and social leaders have been killed by rebel (government) forces will be more likely to vote for government (rebel) affiliated candidates.

However, there are indications that not all violence against civilians alienates supporters. In particular, when the individuals killed are not seen as innocent, violence against them may have the opposite effect on voters, endearing them to the perpetrators. For example, de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca (2013) find that Batsuna's vote share increases rather than decreases when the ETA kills drug dealers and informers, while Altier (2019) argues that vigilante attacks by the PIRA on alleged criminals actually increase support for Sinn Féin.

Similarly, research by Levy (2020) suggests that people are less inclined to electorally punish perpetrators who target civilian informants than perpetrators who engage in collective or indiscriminate violence. In other words, there is heterogeneity in the ways in which the public responds to violence. Given this heterogeneity, it is unsurprising that, in a cross-national study on postwar elections between 1970 and 2010, Daly (2019) finds that there is no overall effect of wartime levels of civilian abuse on belligerents' levels of electoral success following conflict. In a post-conflict context, like modern Colombia, it is possible that voters see demobilized combatants as a continuing threat and thus do not oppose their deaths, unlike the deaths of social leaders. Voters may even support the assassinations of demobilized combatants. If so, then the following hypothesis would be true:

- *Armed-Group Affiliated Candidates Hypothesis 2:* Voters in municipalities in which social leaders have been killed by rebel (government) forces will be *more* likely to vote for government (rebel) affiliated candidates whereas voters in municipalities in which former combatants have been killed by rebel (government) forces will be *less* likely to vote for government (rebel) affiliated candidates.

Although violence against civilians perpetrated by the government is a wartime phenomenon, a parallel form of violence which occurs during peacetime is repression. Both phenomena involve physical violence against non-combatants, often for their political affiliations with groups that oppose the state. An extensive literature has focused on how state repression shapes the behavior of social movements and dissidents (Davenport, 2007; Ritter and Conrad, 2016, e.g.), but there is less research on how the public reacts to such repression, including electorally. One study of Catalonia suggests that repression of Catalan activists increased public sympathy for independence as well as heightened public dislike of actors perceived to be affiliated with the Spanish government (Balcells et al., 2020). These effects of repression may be enduring. In fact, one study suggests that communities which were more heavily repressed under Stalin are less likely to participate politically in the present (Zhukov and Talibova, 2018). Although promising, this literature is too limited currently to

offer concrete hypotheses about how the deaths of social leaders and demobilized combatants would affect elections in Colombia.

3 Data and Methods

3.1 Case Selection and Application of Hypotheses to Colombia

Although in 2016 the Colombian government signed a peace agreement with the FARC, the largest rebel group in Colombia's long-running civil war, the country remains at a very fragile peace. Other rebel forces such as the ELN, new paramilitary groups and organized crime structures such as the Águilas Negras, and remobilized FARC combatants continue to fight and to capture areas previously held by the FARC. As of the end of 2019, only a quarter of the peace agreement's provisions had been fully implemented (Institute, 2019). The country is so unstable that one prominent scholar has argued that Colombia might be entering a new cycle of violence (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2020).

Amidst this ongoing instability, a significant number of civic leaders and ex-combatants have been killed. Between the signing of the peace agreement in 2016 and November 25th of 2020, more than 249 demobilized members of the FARC were assassinated; another 272 reported threats made against them (JEP, 2020). Similarly, between the signing of the peace agreement and August of 2020, 1000 social leaders were killed (Indepaz, 2020a). In 2020 alone, 310 leaders were killed (Indepaz, 2020b). For more details about the timing of these deaths, see Figure 1.

Scholars and political analysts have offered a wide array of theories about the causes of this wave of deaths, attributing the violence to criminal groups, armed groups, illicit economies, land disputes, power vacuums, poor peace accord design, weak implementation of the accord, and more (Prem et al., 2018; Castro et al., 2020; Albarracín et al., 2020; Gutiérrez et al., 2020; Nichols and Fariss, 2020). One reason for this lack of consensus about the causes of the deaths is a lack of data about the perpetrators and thus about

the circumstances in which acts of violence have occurred. In fact, as Castro et al. (2020) summarize, we can identify fewer than twenty percent of the perpetrators of violence against social leaders. Those perpetrators who have been identified include not only non-state groups such as guerrillas and paramilitaries, but also state forces.

The current violence against social leaders and demobilized combatants echoes a range of previous forms of violence in the country. For example, when the FARC created its first political party, the Unión Patriótica (UP), in 1985, paramilitaries and government forces responded by systematically killing UP members. Before the UP was eliminated, it won elections throughout the areas that FARC controlled, in part because decentralization allowed Colombians to elect their own mayors for the first time. One estimate suggests that almost 1,600 party members/affiliates were assassinated, massacred, or disappeared between 1985-1997 (Romero Ospina, 2011). Furthermore, Steele (2017) shows that areas with higher number of UP sympathizers suffered more from violence against civilians, leading to subsequent forced displacement.

More broadly, more than 80 percent of the victims of the Colombian conflict were non-combatants, and all armed groups pursued a strategy of targeting civilians (Grupo de Memoria Histórica, 2013). Although violence against civilians can have many purposes, one historical use of such targeting in Colombia is to affect electoral outcomes. In fact, Colombia has an extensive history of what is sometimes called *armed clientelism*, in which politicians provide economic resources and judicial protection to armed actors while non-state groups provide votes to partner politicians. In other words, armed groups use violence or the threat of it to increase political support for their preferred candidates (Eaton, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2013; Gallego, 2018b). Given this long history of wartime violence against civilians, including against civilians with particular ideologies, voters may interpret the assassinations of demobilized combatants and social leaders in a variety of ways. This is particularly likely because there is so little clarity surrounding the perpetrators of the deaths of social leaders and ex-combatants.

The presidential election in 2018 and regional elections in 2019 offer opportunities to assess the impact of the assassinations on turnout and vote choice. One candidate in the 2018 runoff, Iván Duque, is a right-wing politician who campaigned on a platform of renegotiating the peace agreement to include harsher punishment for guerrillas. The other candidate, Gustavo Petro, is a progressive former guerrilla who fought with the M-19 in the 1980s and who supported the peace agreement (Daniels and Vulliamy, 2018). The president before the 2018 election, Juan Manuel Santos, negotiated the peace deal with the FARC and was considered a centrist. In his attitude toward the FARC, Santos most closely resembled Petro. However, like Duque, Santos was closely affiliated with the hawkish former President, Álvaro Uribe. However, Uribe did not continue to support Santos throughout the latter's administration. In fact, President Uribe founded an alternative political party, the Democratic Center, of which the current President, Iván Duque, is a member. As such, neither candidate was clearly the incumbent, although it is clear that Duque was the hawkish candidate and Petro was the dovish candidate.

The first *Electoral Violence Hypothesis* implies that voters in municipalities where social leaders and combatants have been killed will be less likely to turn out to vote in the election. An alternative hypothesis is that this turnout decline is particularly pronounced in leftist municipalities; in other words, there may be an interaction between assassinations and political leaning of the area in which the assassinations have occurred. This hypothesis can be tested using data from both 2018 and 2019. The *Hawk-Dove Hypotheses* predicts either that voters in areas where leaders and ex-combatants had been killed would be more likely to vote for Petro (the dove) in the 2018 elections or, conversely, that they would be more likely to vote for Duque (the hawk) when compared to areas that had not suffered from such assassinations. Although existing literature is inconclusive about which candidate the assassinations will increase votes for, both of the relevant hypotheses deriving from this literature suggest that assassinations will shape which candidates voters support.

The empirical implications of the *Armed Group Affiliated Candidates Hypotheses* are

less clear. The perpetrators of many of the assassinations are unknown, but the known perpetrators include a range of non-state groups as well as government-affiliated forces. As such, we are unable to identify precisely which assassinations were perpetrated by government forces and which were perpetrated by rebel forces. However, in our empirical tests, we will assume that voters perceive all of the assassinations as perpetrated by non-state groups unaffiliated with the state. That is how the deaths have been portrayed in popular media as well as in much of the research on the subject (e.g. Prem et al., 2018; Restrepo et al., 2020). If the rebels are seen responsible for the deaths, then *Armed Group Affiliated Candidates Hypothesis 1* suggests that all of the assassinations should increase support for government-affiliated candidates. Given that neither Petro nor Duque are affiliated with rebel groups, this hypothesis effectively predicts that the assassinations of both demobilized combatants and social leaders should increase turnout in the affected municipalities. In contrast, *Armed Group Affiliated Candidates Hypothesis 2* suggests that the deaths of social leaders should increase turnout whereas the deaths of demobilized combatants should decrease turnout. In other words, people should oppose the deaths of social leaders but support the deaths of demobilized combatants. This is a plausible scenario because, after decades of fighting, the FARC lacks support among the public. For example, in 2018, less than 6 percent of Colombians had confidence in the FARC, and fewer than 20 percent of Colombians agreed that demobilized FARC fighters who were not commanders shouldn't have to go to jail (Dugand et al., 2018). This public attitude is one explanation for the FARC's resounding electoral defeats in their first elections since the peace accord (Vélez, 2019). A summary of the ways in which the relevant hypotheses are operationalized can be found below in Table 1.

Table 1: **Operationalized Predictions**

| Hypothesis | Dependent Variable | Effect on Vote Choice | Effect on Turnout |
|-------------------------------------|---|------------------------------|---|
| Electoral Violence 1 | Leader, Ex-Combatant Deaths | | ↓ turnout |
| Electoral Violence 2 | Leader, Ex-Combatant Deaths | | ↓ turnout larger in leftist municipalities |
| Hawk-Dove 1 | Leader, Ex-Combatant Deaths | ↑ Petro support | |
| Hawk-Dove 2 | Leader, Ex-Combatant Deaths | ↑ Duque support | |
| Armed Group-Affiliated Candidates 1 | Leader, Ex-Combatant Deaths | | ↑ turnout |
| Armed Group-Affiliated Candidates 2 | 1) Leader Deaths 2) Ex-Combatant Deaths | | 1) ↑ turnout 2) ↓ turnout |

3.2 Data and Regression Design

To empirically test our hypotheses, we constructed a novel dataset on violence and electoral outcomes by integrating data from a wide variety of sources. The electoral data comes from the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. More specifically, we utilize as our dependent variables municipal-level data on the 2018 presidential run-offs and the 2019 regional elections because these were the first Colombian elections after the negotiation of the 2016 peace accords. We collect data on the second round of the 2018 presidential election rather than the first because there were two candidates in the run-off with diametrically opposite attitudes towards the peace accords, allowing for the evaluation of the *Hawk-Dove Hypotheses*. In contrast, the first-round of the presidential election featured a range of candidates with more similar policies toward the conflict. In addition, because Colombia has a multi-party system and the 2019 mayoral elections featured a wide range of parties and candidates, we do not evaluate hypotheses related to vote choice for the 2019 election. We focus exclusively on measures of political participation. Therefore, throughout the results section, information on the 2019 election will serve primarily as a robustness check. For both sets of elections, the variable “Turnout” measures the number of individuals in a given municipality who voted divided by the number of eligible registered voters in that municipality. Other measures

of electoral participation besides turnout include the percentage of voters who voted for a party rather than blank or null (“Percentage Votes for Candidates”), the percentage of voters who voted blank (“Percentage Blank Votes”), and the percentage of voters who voted null (“Percentage Null Votes”).² In order to test the hypotheses relating to vote choice, we use the variable “Votes Duque/Votes Petro,” a value which indicates the number of votes for Duque in the second round of the 2018 presidential election in a given municipality divided by the number of votes for Petro in that same municipality in the same election. As such, this variable does not capture the percentage of voters who voted for Duque but rather the percentage of voters who specified a candidate and who voted for Duque rather than for Petro.


Our key independent variables relate to the deaths of demobilized combatants and social leaders between the congressional approval of the peace accord on November 29, 2016 and the relevant election. The variable “Leaders Killed Before Elections” was built using the lists of social leader assassinations identified by Colombian media outlets and think tanks.³ We merged all these lists of leader assassinations to identify the common entries and produce a comprehensive set of information about the date and location of these deaths. We identify 182 instances of social leader assassination prior to the 2018 election and 247 instances prior to the 2019 election. More than 75 percent of all municipalities in Colombia experienced no assassinations of leaders between the peace agreement and the 2018 election. We disaggregate our results by leader type in Appendix Tables 8 and 9. Secondly, the “Ex-Combatants Killed Before Elections” variable derives from a list of killings collected by the JEP, a transitional justice institution established in the 2016 peace accord. Our data contains 34 instances of ex-combatant assassinations prior to the 2018 election and 91 deaths prior to the 2019 election. Although the JEP is widely considered a neutral institution, it is possible that it is biased in favor of the state because it is a governmental institution. Thus, in robustness

²In Colombia, an individual can cast a vote for a party, for a specific candidate, vote blank, or do something to make his or her vote null. All these possibilities are considered valid votes and are included in the turnout statistics.

³The sources were INDEPAZ, Somos Defensores, IEPRI and Osorio Granados (2020)

checks, we assess whether the results hold using ex-combatant assassinations data provided by the FARC/Comunes political party as well as a German foundation, Heinrich Boll Stiftung (HBS). Results for these robustness tests can be found in Appendix Table 7. The variable “All Killed Before Elections” is the sum of “Leaders Killed Before Elections” and “Ex-Combatants Killed Before Elections.” Information about when leaders and ex-combatants were killed can be found in Figure 1.⁴

Figure 1: Number of Killed Ex-Combatants and Social Leaders since 2016



We also use a set of controls across all regressions. Firstly, we utilize information from the CEDE Panel concerning basic needs which are not satisfied (“NBI Index”) and the geodesic distance to the closest market in 2018 (“Distance to Market”) (Acevedo et al., 2014). In order to control for exposure to conflict, we utilize a binary variable (“PDET Municipality”) which indicates whether a municipality was prioritized by the Colombian government for development projects after the peace accord because of its history of conflict. We also include a measure of post-conflict violence against civilians (“Violent Events Post-Accord, ViPPA”). This variable indicates the number of violent events targeting civilians in a given municipality between the peace agreement’s congressional passage and the 2018 election.

⁴Given limited data availability and significant uncertainty surrounding the details of many of the deaths, we cannot disaggregate our analyses by perpetrator.

The data for this variable come from the Violent Presence of Armed Actors in Colombia dataset, ViPPA. ViPPA uses an algorithm to read reports containing a collection of human rights violations from a Colombian think tank (Osorio et al., 2019). Lastly, because both ex-combatants and social leaders may be targeted in leftist areas, we include a variable which measures the percentage of voters in a given municipality who voted for the Polo Democrático Alternativo in the first round of the 2014 presidential election (“Percentage Support Polo, 2014 Elections Round 1”). This party is the largest leftist organization in Colombia, and in 2014 the party’s presidential candidate won 15 percent of the first round vote. For further details about variable distributions, municipal-level descriptive statistics about all variables can be found in Appendix Table 13.

Additionally, because it is possible that social leaders and ex-combatants are targeted in part because of the prior electoral behavior of voters in their area, we include lagged measures of vote choice and political engagement in each regression. Presidential elections occurred in 2014 and 2018, and regional elections occurred in 2015 and 2019.⁵ Thus, when the dependent variable is turnout in the second round of the 2018 presidential election, we include a measure of the turnout in the second-round of the 2014 presidential election (“Turnout 2014”). Similarly, when the dependent variable is turnout in the 2019 regional elections, we include a variable measuring turnout in the 2015 presidential elections (“Turnout 2015”). Models in which the dependent variable is the percentage of votes for parties, percentage of blank votes, and percentage of null votes have identical variables regarding the prior election at the same level (presidential, regional). However, because Colombia has a wide range of political parties, the second round of the 2014 presidential election cannot easily be compared to the second round of the 2018 election. The 2018 second round was between a right-wing candidate who was a member of the Democratic Center and a left-wing candidate who ran under a coalition of multiple political parties, including the Patriotic Union, the Independent Social Alliance Movement, and the Alternative Indigenous and Social Movement. In contrast,

⁵Note that, while presidential elections have two rounds and we use data on the second one, regional elections have only one round.

the second round of the 2014 presidential election was between a centrist candidate from the National Unity Party and a right-wing candidate from the Democratic Center. Instead of comparing vote choice in 2018 to vote choice in 2014, we use “Support for 2016 Referendum.” Because one of the major differences between the two candidates in 2018 was their position on the peace agreement with the FARC, as discussed above, this measure of 2016 referendum support effectively serves as a lagged measure of the percentage of pro-peace and anti-peace voters in each municipality.

4 Results

We run a series of OLS models with robust standard errors and department-level fixed effects to evaluate our hypotheses about both turnout and vote choice. Table 2 presents the effects of killings on 2018 (columns 1 through 6) as well as 2019 turnout (columns 7 through 9). Given that turnout is a measure of political participation, Table 3 examines other measures of political engagement in 2018: the percentage of votes for political parties, the percentage of blank votes, and the percentage of null votes. Table 4 evaluates the effect of assassinations on vote choice in the 2018 election. Overall, the results suggest that the assassinations are correlated with decreased political participation as well as decreased support for Duque.

Table 2 suggests that the killings of both social leaders and ex-combatants are correlated with reduced turnout. The deaths of ex-combatants and social leaders are negatively correlated with 2018 turnout, as is a measure of all deaths (the sum of leader and ex-combatant deaths). However, none of these relationships are statistically significant when control variables are included in the models. In contrast, “Ex-Combatants Killed Before 2019 Election,” “Leaders Killed Before 2019 Elections,” and “All Killed Before 2019 Elections” are all statistically significant and negative. Substantively, because turnout is measured on a scale of 0-1, the coefficient of -.004 on each of these three variables implies that the death of a single leader

or ex-combatant in a municipality reduced turnout there by almost half a percentage point in the 2019 regional election. For an average municipality with 31,558 registered voters, this implies a reduction of 126 voters for every additional death. Appendix Table 7 suggests that these negative results are robust to using other sources of combatant death data. There are two possible explanations for why the variables are negative but not statistically significant in the models concerning the 2018 election but negative and statistically significant in those regarding the 2019 election. First, there are a larger number of municipalities with deaths in 2019 than in 2018, meaning there are more non-zero observations. Alternatively, it may be that local levels of violence have a larger impact on local elections than national ones. In fact, political participation is larger in local than in national elections (Barrero et al., 2013).

Table 3 provides further evidence that the violence produces reduced political participation: even among those who turned out to the polls in 2018, voters exposed to assassinations were less likely to vote for political parties (Columns 1-3) but more likely to vote blank (Columns 4-6) and null (Columns 7-9). These relationships hold more strongly for ex-combatants than for leaders. Appendix Table 6 runs the same analyses as Table 3 but on 2019 election results; the results are substantively similar to those in Table 3.

The combined evidence from Tables 2 and 3 provides support for *Electoral Violence Hypothesis 1* in that deaths of both leaders and ex-combatants is correlated with reduced political participation. Because there is a negative, rather than a positive, correlation between all three measures of deaths and turnout, the results do not provide evidence for either of the *Armed-Group Affiliated Candidates Hypotheses*. It is possible that voters attribute most or all of the violence to rebels, as we have assumed, and still don't vote in greater numbers for government-affiliated candidates in response to the deaths. Alternatively, it is possible that voters actually attribute the deaths primarily to government forces and paramilitaries. Given that no rebel affiliated candidates were on the ballot in the 2018 elections, voters would turn away from government candidates if this were the case, thereby reducing turnout, as observed in Table 2.

As for vote choice, Table 4 below illustrates the correlation between killings and 2018 vote choice. The results suggest that assassinations lead to reduced support for Duque i.e. increased support for Petro. While the relationship between ex-combatant deaths and the percentage of support for Duque is negative, it is not statistically significant. Thus, the deaths of leaders seem to drive changes to vote choice more so than the deaths of ex-combatants. Overall, however, these results provide support for the *Hawk-Dove Hypothesis 1*, which suggests that voters in municipalities exposed to the deaths will be more likely to vote for dovish candidates. As such, the results do not provide support for the alternative hypothesis, that voters in municipalities in which former combatants and social leaders have been killed will be more likely to vote for hawkish candidates.

Table 2: Effects of Killings on 2018 and 2019 Turnout

| | Dependent variable: | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | 2018 Turnout | | | 2019 Turnout | | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| All Killed Before 2018 Elections | -0.019*** (0.004) | | | -0.002 (0.002) | | | | | |
| Ex-Combatants Killed Before 2018 Elections | | -0.028*** (0.009) | | | -0.007 (0.004) | | | | |
| Leaders Killed Before 2018 Election | | | -0.019*** (0.005) | | | -0.001 (0.003) | | | |
| All Killed Before 2019 Election | | | | | | | -0.004*** (0.001) | | |
| Ex-Combatants Killed Before 2019 Elections | | | | | | | | -0.004*** (0.002) | |
| Leaders Killed Before 2019 Elections | | | | | | | | | -0.004** (0.002) |
| Violent Events Post-Accord, ViPPA | | | | -0.0002* (0.0001) | -0.0002* (0.0001) | -0.0002* (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0002 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) |
| PDET Municipality | | | | -0.010** (0.005) | -0.010** (0.005) | -0.011** (0.005) | -0.007 (0.004) | -0.008* (0.004) | -0.008* (0.004) |
| Nbi Index | | | | -0.0099*** (0.016) | -0.100*** (0.016) | -0.099*** (0.016) | 0.021 (0.014) | 0.021 (0.014) | 0.021 (0.014) |
| Distance to Market | | | | -0.00005 (0.00003) | -0.00005 (0.00003) | -0.00005 (0.00003) | -0.0001 (0.00005) | -0.0001 (0.00005) | -0.0001 (0.00005) |
| Percentage Support Polo, 2014 Elections Round 1 | | | | 0.074*** (0.020) | 0.073*** (0.020) | 0.073*** (0.020) | -0.047** (0.024) | -0.048** (0.024) | -0.050** (0.024) |
| Turnout 2014 | | | | 0.713*** (0.019) | 0.713*** (0.019) | 0.714*** (0.019) | | | |
| Turnout 2015 | | | | | | | 0.751*** (0.059) | 0.756*** (0.058) | 0.751*** (0.059) |
| Constant | 0.523*** (0.003) | 0.520*** (0.003) | 0.523*** (0.003) | 0.226*** (0.026) | 0.225*** (0.026) | 0.225*** (0.026) | 0.222*** (0.055) | 0.217*** (0.055) | 0.222*** (0.056) |
| Observations | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,099 | 1,099 | 1,099 |
| R ² | 0.018 | 0.008 | 0.013 | 0.850 | 0.850 | 0.850 | 0.764 | 0.763 | 0.763 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.017 | 0.007 | 0.012 | 0.845 | 0.845 | 0.844 | 0.755 | 0.754 | 0.755 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.093 | 0.094 | 0.094 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 |
| F Statistic | 20.460*** | 8.593*** | 14.495*** | 160.919*** | 161.164*** | 160.674*** | 90.065*** | 89.775*** | 89.859*** |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All regressions are OLS, include departmental fixed effects, and include robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable in models 1-6 is 2018 turnout, and the dependent variable in columns 7-9 is 2019 turnout.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3: Effect of Killings on Types of Votes (2018)

| | Percentage Votes for Parties | | | Percentage Blank Votes | | | Percentage Null Votes | | |
|--|------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| All Killed Before 2018 Elections | -0.002*** (0.001) | | | 0.001** (0.0005) | | | 0.0004* (0.0002) | | |
| Ex-Combatants Killed Before 2018 Elections | | -0.005*** (0.001) | | | 0.003*** (0.001) | | | 0.001** (0.001) | |
| Leaders Killed Before 2018 Elections | | | -0.001* (0.001) | | | 0.001 (0.0004) | | | 0.0002 (0.0003) |
| Violent Events Post-Accord, VIPAA | -0.00003 (0.00003) | -0.00005** (0.00002) | -0.00004 (0.00003) | 0.00003 (0.00002) | 0.00004** (0.00002) | 0.00003* (0.00002) | 0.00001** (0.00001) | 0.00002*** (0.00001) | 0.00001** (0.00001) |
| PDET Municipality | -0.004*** (0.001) | -0.004*** (0.001) | -0.005*** (0.001) | 0.002*** (0.001) | 0.002*** (0.001) | 0.003*** (0.001) | 0.002*** (0.001) | 0.002*** (0.0005) | 0.002*** (0.001) |
| Nbi Index | 0.013*** (0.003) | 0.013*** (0.003) | 0.013*** (0.003) | -0.016*** (0.003) | -0.016*** (0.003) | -0.016*** (0.003) | 0.002 (0.001) | 0.002* (0.001) | 0.002* (0.001) |
| Distance to Market | -0.00001 (0.00001) | -0.00001 (0.00001) | -0.00001 (0.00001) | 0.00001* (0.00001) | 0.00001* (0.00001) | 0.00001* (0.00001) | 0.00000 (0.00001) | 0.00000 (0.00001) | 0.00000 (0.00001) |
| Percentage Support Polo, 2014 Election Round 1 | -0.016* (0.009) | -0.017* (0.009) | -0.016* (0.010) | 0.006 (0.008) | 0.006 (0.008) | 0.006 (0.008) | 0.0003 (0.003) | 0.0004 (0.003) | 0.0004 (0.003) |
| Percentage Votes for Candidates, 2014 | 0.471*** (0.040) | 0.468*** (0.040) | 0.474*** (0.041) | | | | | | |
| Percentage Blank Votes, 2014 | | | | 0.517*** (0.072) | 0.516*** (0.072) | 0.519*** (0.073) | | | |
| Percentage Null Votes, 2014 | | | | | | | 0.432*** (0.023) | 0.431*** (0.023) | 0.433*** (0.023) |
| Constant | 0.534*** (0.037) | 0.536*** (0.037) | 0.531*** (0.038) | -0.002 (0.007) | -0.002 (0.007) | -0.003 (0.007) | -0.005 (0.004) | -0.005 (0.004) | -0.005 (0.004) |
| Observations | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 |
| R ² | 0.730 | 0.732 | 0.727 | 0.745 | 0.746 | 0.744 | 0.589 | 0.589 | 0.588 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.720 | 0.722 | 0.717 | 0.736 | 0.737 | 0.735 | 0.575 | 0.575 | 0.574 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| F Statistic | 76.755*** | 77.616*** | 75.662*** | 83.155*** | 83.689*** | 82.430*** | 40.759*** | 40.840*** | 40.617*** |

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. All regressions are OLS, include departmental fixed effects, and utilize robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable for columns 1-3 is the percentage of votes cast for candidates, for columns 2-6 it is the percentage of blank votes, and for columns 7-9 it is the percentage of null votes.

Table 4: Effect of Killing on Vote Choice 2018

| | <i>Dependent variable: Votes Duque/Votes Petro</i> | | | | | |
|--|--|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| All Killed Before 2018 Elections | -0.601*** (0.142) | | | -0.239** (0.094) | | |
| Ex-Combatants Killed Before 2018 Elections | | -0.360 (0.322) | | | -0.166 (0.116) | |
| Leaders Killed Before 2018 Elections | | | -0.747*** (0.168) | | | -0.279** (0.118) |
| Violent Events Post-Accord, ViPPA | | | | -0.011*** (0.003) | -0.013*** (0.004) | -0.010*** (0.003) |
| PDET Municipality | | | | -0.670*** (0.174) | -0.738*** (0.175) | -0.697*** (0.174) |
| Nbi Index | | | | 1.944*** (0.556) | 1.911*** (0.559) | 1.954*** (0.557) |
| Distance to Market | | | | -0.006*** (0.001) | -0.006*** (0.001) | -0.006*** (0.001) |
| Percentage Support Polo, 2014 Election Round 1 | | | | -16.181*** (1.288) | -16.279*** (1.296) | -16.194*** (1.286) |
| Percentage Support 2016 Plebiscite | | | | -6.672*** (0.594) | -6.720*** (0.598) | -6.692*** (0.594) |
| Constant | 3.201*** (0.099) | 3.096*** (0.096) | 3.207*** (0.099) | 10.597*** (1.140) | 10.606*** (1.145) | 10.627*** (1.137) |
| Observations | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,119 | 1,119 | 1,119 |
| R ² | 0.016 | 0.001 | 0.017 | 0.611 | 0.610 | 0.611 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.015 | 0.0002 | 0.016 | 0.598 | 0.596 | 0.598 |
| Residual Std. Error | 3.177 | 3.200 | 3.174 | 2.031 | 2.036 | 2.031 |
| F Statistic | 17.982*** | 1.255 | 19.740*** | 44.695*** | 44.375*** | 44.687*** |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All regressions are OLS, include departmental fixed effects, and utilize robust standard errors are in parentheses. All dependent variables are the number of votes for Duque divided by the number of votes for Petro in the 2018 presidential runoff election.

We also look for heterogeneity in treatment effects in our data. Firstly, in order to examine *Electoral Violence Hypothesis 2*, we interact assassinations with the percentage of vote share in the previous election for the largest leftist party in the country: the Democratic Pole. Because none of the interactions are statistically significant, the results in Table 12 suggest that the effects of leader and ex-combatant deaths on electoral outcomes do not vary by local ideological leanings. Secondly, we consider whether all leader assassinations have the same effects on electoral outcomes. For example, the deaths of victim advocates may not be perceived the same way as the deaths of environmental activists. Indeed, a

range of scholars as well as the United Nations have argued that the violence is intricately tied to land disputes, coca cultivation, and broader environmental issues (Council, 2019; Castro et al., 2020; Gutiérrez et al., 2020). Thus, we examine the effects of the deaths of environmental leaders (who led environmental organizations or coca substitution programs) as well as anti-business leaders (labor and environmental leaders) and social leaders (who are not anti-business). The results can be found in Appendix Tables 8 and 9. Many of these analyses are not statistically significant, likely because we lack statistical power. Nonetheless, the results which are significant parallel those in the main analysis, suggesting that leader deaths have similar effects regardless of the type of leader killed. Overall, these examinations suggest that the relationship between assassinations and electoral outcomes does not vary based on the ideology of the municipality in which the leader is killed nor based on the kind of leader killed.

We also conducted a placebo treatment as suggested by Eggers et al. (2021) in which we use deaths after the election as our main independent variable. Since our argument relates to assassinations before elections, the results from these tests should be statistically significant if our argument is correct. This is in fact what we see in Tables 10 and 11 in the appendix, therefore lending support to our findings.

5 Possible Mechanisms

While the municipal-level results robustly suggest that the assassinations reduce political engagement and support for the more hawkish candidate, they cannot provide insight into the reasons why people react to the deaths in this fashion. As such, we utilize the 2019 Colombia Political Culture Survey, which is produced by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), to engage in exploratory analysis of the ways in which the deaths of social leaders and demobilized combatants shape political beliefs. This survey was fielded between April 1st and June 30th of 2019. It has national coverage, excluding new

departments in which approximately 1 percent of the population lives; it is representative at the level of populated urban centers. While the survey has a multi-stage probabilistic sampling strategy, the publicly available data does not include information about the municipality of each respondent. The smallest geographic disaggregation is the regional level (Bogotá, Caribe, Oriental, Central, Pacífica). As such, it is impossible to assess the impact of observed assassinations of social leaders and demobilized combatants. Instead, we exploit a question about whether “in the previous year, your community has seen a surge in... selective assassinations or violent deaths.” This variable in the below analyses is called “selective violence, community.” Given that this question asks respondents about the year between mid-2018 and mid-2019, any local increase in deaths referred to in the survey occurs after the 2018 presidential election. Furthermore, the survey was fielded prior to the 2019 regional elections. As such, it is impossible to analyze the impact that increased violent deaths had on the 2018 or 2019 elections; in other words, we cannot replicate the municipal-level results at the individual level. Nonetheless, we are able to assess whether recent changes in local levels of selective assassinations or violent deaths are correlated with specific political attitudes.

We primarily consider three categories of political attitudes which could plausibly be affected by the deaths: attitudes toward personal safety, beliefs about how to solve political problems, and beliefs about the state of Colombian democracy. As discussed above in the theory-building section, all three sets of literature described above suggest that violence affects electoral outcomes primarily by changing voters’ calculations about their personal safety. There are two ways that violence against social leaders and ex-combatants could alter perceptions of personal safety. Firstly, all voters could feel less safe in contexts where deaths have occurred, participating less in politics and voting for the more dovish candidate. Alternatively, it is also possible that only those individuals who fit into the categories of people targeted would feel more unsafe and react in such a fashion. Such individuals could include demobilized combatants, social leaders, or leftists more broadly.

The assassinations could also affect voters’ beliefs about whether violence or nonviolent

politics is a solution to the country's instability. On one hand, the assassinations could signal to voters that, even with a peace accord, stability is not possible within the context of democratic politics. In other words, the deaths could make people less likely to believe that voting is a solution to national problems and more likely to believe that violence is the best solution i.e. that only military victory will lead to peace. These voters would thus be less likely to participate in electoral politics. On the other hand, the deaths could serve as a reminder of the severe negative consequences of a return to war, making voters less likely to believe that violence is a viable solution and thus more likely to vote for the dovish candidate who is supportive of the agreement.

Similarly, the deaths could affect voters' beliefs about the current status of democracy in Colombia, regardless of whether they believe that violent or nonviolent engagement is the best way forward. One of the tenants of the 2019 peace accord was the political participation of the FARC in nonviolent, electoral politics. The creation of the FARC's political party, now called Comunes, should complete the integration of the far-left into the Colombian political system. However, if leftists cannot be safe from violence and are systematically targeted, the Colombian political system does not in reality extend to people of all political beliefs. It thus cannot be fully considered democratic. This could prompt people to vote for the dovish candidate who seeks to involve more people in politics by preserving the peace agreement, thereby making the country more democratic. On the other hand, if people see the quality of Colombian democracy as irredeemably low, they may withdraw from the electoral process.

To measure perceptions of safety ("secure neighborhood"), we exploit a question which asks respondents, on a scale from 1 (dissatisfaction) to 5 (satisfaction), how satisfied they are with the security in their neighborhood or on their street. To operationalize beliefs about the best solution to the nation's problems, we use two measures. The first, "violence solution," concerns whether respondents agree that people should use violence to solve their problems. The second, "importance elections president," concerns, on a scale from 1 to 5, how important national elections are. In other words, the first question measures whether

people think that violence is an effective solution, and the second measures whether people think that voting is an effective approach. Lastly, to measure attitudes toward democracy in Colombia, “satisfaction democracy Colombia” concerns, on a scale from 1 to 5, how satisfied respondents are with the form of democracy in Colombia.

Additionally, we include a series of control variables. The first, “ideology,” ranges from 1 (left) to 10 (right). For the second, we constructed an index variable (“organization participation, relevant”) which measures the sum of respondent participation in various political civil society organizations.⁶ We extend this measure to include participation in less political groups and call it “organization participation, all.”⁷ We also include a range of other control variables, including gender, age, level of education, a measure of rurality which indicates whether people live in municipal capitals (cabeceras municipales), and a binary indicator of whether they voted in the 2018 presidential election.

All regressions below were calculated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the household level (Abadie et al., 2017); they include fixed effects at the regional level.

⁶Juntas de Acción Comunal (JACs), worker’s cooperatives, spaces of participation supported or promoted by the state, ethnic identity organizations, conservation or environmental groups, mutual security associations, unions, campesino groups, political parties or movements, community organizations, or other.

⁷Less political groups are charity groups, religious groups, building organizations, cultural or sporting organizations, or education organizations. The results are robust to using this alternative variable (Appendix 14)

Table 5: Mechanisms


| | 1. Secure Neighborhood | 2. Secure Neighborhood | 3. Violence Solution | 4. Importance Elections President | 5. Satisfaction Democracy Colombia |
|--|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Intercept | 1.35*** (0.07) | 1.37*** (0.07) | 0.75*** (0.02) | 2.77*** (0.06) | 1.68*** (0.06) |
| Woman | -0.03*** (0.01) | -0.03*** (0.01) | -0.03*** (0.00) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.02 (0.01) |
| Age | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00* (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) |
| Level of Education | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.07*** (0.01) | -0.04*** (0.01) |
| Ideology | 0.05*** (0.00) | 0.05*** (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) | 0.05*** (0.00) | 0.08*** (0.00) |
| Selective Violence, Community | -0.16*** (0.03) | -0.19** (0.08) | 0.02** (0.01) | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.09*** (0.02) |
| Rural | 0.56*** (0.02) | 0.56*** (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.02) | 0.06*** (0.02) |
| Vote 2018 | 0.08*** (0.02) | 0.08*** (0.02) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.29*** (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) |
| Organization Participation, Relevant | 0.07*** (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.08*** (0.01) | 0.08*** (0.01) |
| Ideology : Selective Violence, Community | | -0.03*** (0.01) | | | |
| Organization Participation, Relevant : Selective Violence, Community | | 0.09*** (0.02) | | | |
| R ² | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.05 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.05 |
| Num. obs. | 33828 | 33828 | 33239 | 33606 | 33569 |
| RMSE | 1.24 | 1.24 | 0.41 | 1.09 | 1.15 |

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01; All regressions include fixed effects by region, and robust standard errors are clustered by household

Table 5 suggests that local increases in selective violence are negatively correlated with a belief in the security of one's neighborhood, an increased belief in the value of violence as the solution to one's problems, and decreased satisfaction with the state of democracy in Colombia. Additionally, although the relationship is not statistically significant, selective violence is correlated with a decreased belief in the importance of elections. Together, these results suggest that the assassinations affect not only perceptions of security but also attitudes towards the sustainability of electoral politics in place of violent politics.

However, not all citizens are equally affected by selective violence; the interactions in model 2 above are illustrated in Figure 2. Panel A suggests that local increases in selective violence have a particularly negative effect on perceptions of neighborhood security among more conservative people. Put another way, increases in selective violence don't make leftists feel less secure, but they make conservatives feel less secure. At the same time, as Panel B shows, local increases in targeted violence make people who are not actively involved in civil society feel less secure but make those who are very involved in the community feel more secure. Both of these interactions seem to contradict the argument that it is only individuals who are directly physically threatened by the assassinations of social leaders and demobilized combatants who feel more unsafe because of this violence. Perhaps leftists already know that they are not secure, a possibility which is plausible given the historical targeting of UP supporters. If so, recent increases in targeted violence may not affect those leftists' prior beliefs about their safety in their communities. However, the positive interaction between organization participation and local selective violence is more puzzling. Among individuals who are highly involved in community organizations, increases in selective violence are actually correlated with an increased belief in the security of the neighborhood. Perhaps leaders who live in areas where assassinations have already occurred feel like they are secure because the violence spared them. In areas that haven't yet seen the deaths of social leaders, individuals who are engaged in their communities do not know whether they will be targeted or whether their compatriots will be.

Figure 2: Predicted Values, Interactions



While these results should be taken only as exploratory, they indicate that we must look beyond personal security in our examination of the ways in which political violence shapes political participation and vote choice. While decreased perceptions of security could explain depressed political participation and increased support for the dovish candidate, an increased preference for violence and a decreased belief in the value of elections could also explain depressed political engagement. However, it is not clear how this would explain increased support for the dovish candidate, who was a stronger advocate for peace than the other candidate. Lastly, decreased satisfaction with Colombian democracy could lead some people to be less engaged but others to vote for the more pro-democracy candidate. This discussion suggests a range of possible pathways between increased assassinations and depressed political engagement as well as increased support for the dovish candidates. Further research is needed to explore these pathways further.

6 Concluding Remarks

What are the effects of violence against civic leaders and ex-combatants on electoral outcomes in unstable contexts emerging from conflict? This paper focuses on two categories of understudied civilian victims: social leaders and ex-combatants. Prior work has focused on two other kinds of civilians: everyday, regular people or prominent politicians. Regular people lack social and political capital, and politicians have an abundance of it. Social leaders and ex-combatants, in contrast, have more capital than everyday people but less than politicians. Both civic leaders and demobilized combatants are likely to be in communication with government actors, whether via their activism or via DDR programs, but they do not themselves have the capacity to make policy. Given that these assassinations of civic leaders and ex-combatants don't immediately threaten large portions of voters, unlike most violence against regular people or politicians, it is not immediately clear how such violence would impact elections.

We build a set of hypotheses by pulling from a range of research on electoral violence against voters and politicians, wartime violence against civilians, and insurgent violence. Using municipal-level analyses, we find that the killing of social leaders and former combatants in Colombia depresses electoral engagement. Furthermore, such killings decrease support for hawkish politicians. Using individual-level survey data to explore potential mechanisms, we find, in support of existing research, that voters exposed to leader assassinations feel less secure in their neighborhoods. Extending existing scholarship, however, we also find that voters exposed to such violence are less satisfied with democracy and more supportive of violence.

While it is important to understand the threats to ex-combatants and social leaders because both groups of people play a role in promoting sustainable peace, our results suggest that their victimization also has broader impacts on the public. More precisely, our results suggest that assassinations may have countervailing effects on stability through their impact on elections. On one hand, if the assassinations are correlated with increased support for

dovish candidates, that is beneficial to stability because hawkish candidates have the potential to further destabilize a country following a peace accord. On the other hand, democracy is widely held to be a crucial element of recovery from conflict (e.g. Lyons, 2004; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Call, 2012). When citizens disengage from the electoral process, whether by not turning out to vote or choosing not to vote for candidates, the democratic process is undermined. Our exploratory individual-level results suggest that voters may not just be disengaging from particular elections out of fear but retreating from the democratic process more broadly. Given these results, it is crucial to the long-term stability of countries recovering from conflict to identify and prosecute the perpetrators of such assassinations in order to prevent continued violence. Governments may also need to provide additional security to demobilized combatants in order to limit violence against them.

Given such an assessment of the countervailing effects of the assassinations on post-conflict stability, our analysis suggests a challenge to common understandings of conflict and peacetime as clearly bifurcated. Indeed, perhaps the term “post-conflict” is unhelpful. In cases such as Colombia, it may be more useful to conceptualize the period of time following a peace accord as existing along a spectrum of stability. As such, what is crucial is not understanding whether and when “conflict recurrence” will occur, but rather conceptualizing what will make a country more or less stable up to the point of what could be classified as full-fledged conflict. This implies that policies aimed at reconstruction must be extremely sensitive to the current context in a country recovering from conflict.

Future research should move beyond the correlational evidence provided here and establish causality regarding the effects of social leader and ex-combatant killings on electoral participation and vote choice. Additionally, given that many of perpetrators of such violence remain unknown, future research should investigate the possibility that there is a heretofore relatively unexplored logic of credit claiming at work (Abrahms and Conrad, 2017; Kalyvas, 2006). Lastly, future research should work toward unifying the disparate literatures discussed above on the electoral effects of violence against non-combatants.

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7 Appendix

7.1 Robustness Tests: Municipal-Level Results

Table 6: Effects of Killings on Types of Votes (2019)

| | Votes for Parties | | | Blank Votes | | | Null Votes | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| All Killed Before 2019 Elections | -0.001 (0.001) | | | 0.002** (0.001) | | | 0.001*** (0.0001) | | |
| Ex-Combatants Killed Before 2019 Elections | | 0.0001 (0.001) | | | -0.0001 (0.001) | | | 0.001*** (0.0002) | |
| Leaders Killed Before 2019 Elections | | | -0.003** (0.001) | | | 0.004*** (0.001) | | | 0.001** (0.0003) |
| Violent Events Post-Accord, ViPPA | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) | 0.0001 (0.0001) | 0.0001 (0.0001) | 0.0001 (0.0001) | 0.00002** (0.00001) | 0.00003** (0.00001) | 0.00002** (0.00001) |
| PDET Municipality | 0.005* (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.005** (0.003) | -0.005* (0.003) | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.005* (0.003) | -0.0004 (0.001) | -0.0002 (0.001) | -0.0002 (0.001) |
| Nbi Index | 0.028*** (0.010) | 0.028*** (0.010) | 0.028*** (0.010) | -0.025** (0.011) | -0.025** (0.011) | -0.026** (0.011) | -0.001 (0.001) | -0.001 (0.001) | -0.001 (0.001) |
| Distance to Market | 0.0001* (0.00003) | 0.0001* (0.00003) | 0.0001* (0.00003) | -0.0001** (0.00003) | -0.0001** (0.00003) | -0.0001** (0.00003) | -0.00001*** (0.00000) | -0.00001*** (0.00000) | -0.00001*** (0.00000) |
| Percentage Support Polo, 2014 Election Round 1 | -0.063*** (0.014) | -0.065*** (0.014) | -0.064*** (0.014) | 0.075*** (0.015) | 0.078*** (0.015) | 0.076*** (0.015) | 0.011*** (0.002) | 0.011*** (0.002) | 0.012*** (0.002) |
| Percentage Votes for Candidates, 2015 | 0.213*** (0.065) | 0.216*** (0.066) | 0.209*** (0.064) | | | | | | |
| Percentage Blank Votes, 2015 | | | | 0.189** (0.092) | 0.191** (0.093) | 0.186** (0.091) | | | |
| Percentage Null Votes, 2015 | | | | | | | 0.643*** (0.022) | 0.652*** (0.022) | 0.639*** (0.022) |
| Constant | 0.719*** (0.061) | 0.716*** (0.062) | 0.723*** (0.061) | 0.083*** (0.027) | 0.084*** (0.027) | 0.083*** (0.027) | 0.011*** (0.003) | 0.011*** (0.003) | 0.012*** (0.003) |
| Observations | 1,097 | 1,097 | 1,097 | 1,099 | 1,099 | 1,099 | 1,099 | 1,099 | 1,099 |
| R ² | 0.243 | 0.242 | 0.246 | 0.210 | 0.206 | 0.214 | 0.731 | 0.729 | 0.729 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.216 | 0.214 | 0.218 | 0.182 | 0.178 | 0.186 | 0.721 | 0.719 | 0.719 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.026 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| F Statistic | 8.958*** | 8.869*** | 9.063*** | 7.415*** | 7.258*** | 7.600*** | 75.696*** | 75.011*** | 75.064*** |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All regressions are OLS, have departmental fixed effects, and utilize robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable for columns 1-3 is the percentage of votes cast for candidates for Colombia's Mayoral elections in 2019, for columns 2-6 it is the percentage of blank votes in the same election, and for columns 7-9 it is the percentage of null votes.

Table 7: Different Measures of FARC Deaths

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------------|-----|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Turnout 2018 | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Ex-Combatants Killed Before 2018 Elections, FARC Data | -0.008 (0.006) | | | | -0.103 (0.1146) | | |
| Ex-Combatants Killed Before 2018 Elections, HBS Wide Data | | | -0.013* (0.008) | | | -0.125 (0.229) | |
| Ex-Combatants Killed Before 2018 Elections, HBS Narrow Data | | | | -0.015 (0.010) | | | -0.396 (0.377) |
| Violent Events Post-Accord, ViPAA | -0.0002* (0.0001) | | -0.0002* (0.0001) | -0.0002* (0.0001) | -0.013*** (0.004) | -0.013*** (0.004) | -0.013*** (0.004) |
| PDET Municipality | -0.010** (0.005) | | -0.010** (0.005) | -0.011** (0.005) | -0.751*** (0.176) | -0.754*** (0.176) | -0.749*** (0.173) |
| Nbi Index | -0.100*** (0.016) | | -0.099*** (0.016) | -0.099*** (0.016) | 1.912*** (0.559) | 1.916*** (0.560) | 1.927*** (0.561) |
| Distance to Market | -0.00005 (0.00003) | | -0.00005 (0.00003) | -0.00005 (0.00003) | -0.006*** (0.001) | -0.006*** (0.001) | -0.006*** (0.001) |
| Support for 2016 Plebiscite | | | | | -6.726*** (0.600) | -6.725*** (0.599) | -6.705*** (0.600) |
| Percentage Support Polo, 2014 Elections Round 1 | 0.074*** (0.020) | | 0.074*** (0.020) | 0.075*** (0.020) | -16.284*** (1.296) | -16.292*** (1.294) | -16.255*** (1.296) |
| Turnout 2014 | 0.713*** (0.019) | | 0.713*** (0.019) | 0.714*** (0.019) | | | |
| Constant | 0.225*** (0.026) | | 0.225*** (0.026) | 0.224*** (0.026) | 10.613*** (1.144) | 10.613*** (1.143) | 10.596*** (1.144) |
| Observations | 1,120 | | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,119 | 1,119 | 1,119 |
| R ² | 0.850 | | 0.850 | 0.850 | 0.609 | 0.609 | 0.610 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.845 | | 0.845 | 0.845 | 0.596 | 0.596 | 0.596 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.037 | | 0.037 | 0.037 | 2.036 | 2.036 | 2.036 |
| F Statistic | 161.059*** | | 161.364*** | 161.077*** | 44.344*** | 44.342*** | 44.371*** |

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. All regressions are OLS, include departmental fixed effects, and utilize robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable in models 1-3 is 2018 turnout, and in models 4-6 it is the number of votes for Duque divided by the number of votes for Petro in the second round of the 2018 presidential election.

Table 8: Leader Type Disaggregation, 2018 Turnout and Vote Choice

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Turnout 2018 | | | | Votes Duque/Votes Petro | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Labor Leaders Killed Before 2018 Elections | 0.004 (0.008) | | | | -0.010 (0.372) | | | |
| Anti-Business Leaders Killed Before 2018 Elections | | -0.001 (0.007) | | | | -0.080 (0.313) | | |
| Social (Not Anti-Business) Leaders Killed Before 2018 Elections | | | 0.001 (0.005) | | | | -0.504*** (0.178) | |
| Environmental Leaders Killed Before 2018 Elections | | | | -0.019 (0.013) | | | | -0.161 (0.381) |
| Violent Events Post-Conflict, ViPPA | -0.0002* (0.0001) | -0.0002* (0.0001) | -0.0002* (0.0001) | -0.0002* (0.0001) | -0.013*** (0.004) | -0.013*** (0.004) | -0.011*** (0.003) | -0.013*** (0.004) |
| PDET Municipality | -0.011** (0.005) | -0.011** (0.005) | -0.011** (0.005) | -0.011** (0.005) | -0.763*** (0.174) | -0.760*** (0.175) | -0.726*** (0.173) | -0.761*** (0.175) |
| NBI Index | -0.099*** (0.016) | -0.100*** (0.016) | -0.100*** (0.016) | -0.099*** (0.016) | 1.914*** (0.559) | 1.916*** (0.560) | 1.936*** (0.556) | 1.918*** (0.560) |
| Distance to Market | -0.00005 (0.00003) | -0.00005 (0.00003) | -0.00005 (0.00003) | -0.00004 (0.00003) | -0.006*** (0.001) | -0.006*** (0.001) | -0.006*** (0.001) | -0.006*** (0.001) |
| Percent Support for Polo, 2014 Elections Round 1 | 0.071*** (0.020) | 0.073*** (0.020) | 0.072*** (0.020) | 0.072*** (0.020) | -16.296*** (1.294) | -16.275*** (1.296) | -16.233*** (1.280) | -16.301*** (1.294) |
| Turnout 2014 | 0.715*** (0.019) | 0.714*** (0.019) | 0.714*** (0.019) | 0.712*** (0.019) | | | | |
| Support 2016 Plebiscite | | | | | -6.738*** (0.597) | -6.730*** (0.598) | -6.708*** (0.595) | -6.731*** (0.599) |
| Constant | 0.225*** (0.026) | 0.225*** (0.026) | 0.225*** (0.026) | 0.223*** (0.026) | 10.627*** (1.141) | 10.608*** (1.144) | 10.641*** (1.135) | 10.599*** (1.158) |
| Observations | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,119 | 1,119 | 1,119 | 1,119 |
| R ² | 0.850 | 0.850 | 0.850 | 0.850 | 0.609 | 0.609 | 0.611 | 0.609 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.844 | 0.844 | 0.844 | 0.845 | 0.596 | 0.596 | 0.597 | 0.596 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 2.036 | 2.036 | 2.032 | 2.036 |
| F Statistic | 160.690*** | 160.629*** | 160.646*** | 161.078*** | 44.334*** | 44.337*** | 44.641*** | 44.338*** |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All regressions include fixed effects by department and robust standard errors. We consider labor leaders those who were leaders of peasant organizations and local syndicates. Environmental leaders are those that either worked in environmental organizations or were leading coca substitution programs. Anti-business leaders are the combination of labor and environmental individuals. Social leaders are all leaders that are not labor or environmental leaders.

Table 9: Leader Type Disaggregation, 2019 Turnout

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Turnout 2019 | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Labor Leaders Killed Before 2019 Elections | 0.0001 (0.006) | | | |
| Anti-Business Leaders Killed Before 2019 Elections | | 0.001 (0.007) | | |
| Social (Not Anti-Business) Leaders Killed Before 2019 Elections | | | -0.009** (0.004) | |
| Environmental Leaders Killed Before 2019 Elections | | | | 0.005 (0.015) |
| Violent Events Post-Accord, ViPPA | -0.0002 (0.0001) | -0.0002 (0.0001) | -0.0002 (0.0001) | -0.0002 (0.0001) |
| PDET Municipality | -0.010** (0.004) | -0.010** (0.004) | -0.009** (0.004) | -0.010** (0.004) |
| NBI Index | 0.020 (0.014) | 0.020 (0.014) | 0.021 (0.014) | 0.020 (0.014) |
| Distance to Market | -0.0001 (0.00005) | -0.0001 (0.00005) | -0.0001 (0.00005) | -0.0001 (0.00005) |
| Percentage Support for Polo, 2014 Elections Round 1 | -0.051** (0.024) | -0.052** (0.024) | -0.049** (0.024) | -0.051** (0.025) |
| Turnout 2015 | 0.758*** (0.058) | 0.758*** (0.058) | 0.753*** (0.059) | 0.759*** (0.059) |
| Constant | 0.216*** (0.055) | 0.216*** (0.055) | 0.220*** (0.055) | 0.217*** (0.055) |
| Observations | 1,099 | 1,099 | 1,099 | 1,099 |
| R ² | 0.762 | 0.762 | 0.763 | 0.762 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.754 | 0.754 | 0.755 | 0.754 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 1060) | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 |
| F Statistic (df = 38; 1060) | 89.455*** | 89.456*** | 89.819*** | 89.477*** |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: All regressions include fixed effects by department and robust standard errors. We consider labor leaders those who were leaders of peasant organizations and local syndicates. Environmental leaders are those that either worked in environmental organizations or were leading coca substitution programs. Anti-business leaders are the combination of labor and environmental individuals. Social leaders are all leaders that are not labor or environmental leaders.

Table 10: Placebo Test, Turnout

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | |
|---|----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | Turnout 2018 | | | Turnout 2019 | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| All Killed After 2018 Elections | -0.001 (0.002) | | | | | |
| Ex-Combatants Killed After 2018 Elections | | 0.0003 (0.003) | | | | |
| Leaders Killed After 2018 Election | | | -0.001 (0.003) | | | |
| All Killed After 2019 Election | | | | -0.003* (0.002) | | |
| Ex-Combatants Killed After 2019 Elections | | | | | -0.005 (0.004) | |
| Leaders Killed After 2019 Elections | | | | | | -0.003 (0.002) |
| Violent Events Post-Accord, ViPPA | -0.0002* (0.0001) | -0.0002* (0.0001) | -0.0002* (0.0001) | -0.0002 (0.0001) | -0.0002 (0.0001) | -0.0002 (0.0001) |
| PDET Municipality | -0.011** (0.005) | -0.011** (0.005) | -0.011** (0.005) | -0.008* (0.004) | -0.009** (0.004) | -0.008** (0.004) |
| NBI Index | -0.099*** (0.016) | -0.100*** (0.016) | -0.100*** (0.016) | 0.021 (0.014) | 0.021 (0.014) | 0.021 (0.014) |
| Distance to Market | -0.00005 (0.00003) | -0.00005 (0.00003) | -0.00005 (0.00003) | -0.0001 (0.00005) | -0.0001 (0.00005) | -0.0001 (0.00005) |
| Percentage Support Polo, 2014 Elections Round 1 | 0.074*** (0.020) | 0.072*** (0.020) | 0.073*** (0.020) | -0.048** (0.024) | -0.049** (0.024) | -0.050** (0.024) |
| Turnout 2014 | 0.713*** (0.019) | 0.714*** (0.019) | 0.713*** (0.019) | | | |
| Turnout 2015 | | | | 0.752*** (0.059) | 0.756*** (0.059) | 0.753*** (0.059) |
| Constant | 0.226*** (0.026) | 0.225*** (0.026) | 0.226*** (0.026) | 0.224*** (0.056) | 0.217*** (0.055) | 0.222*** (0.056) |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All regressions include fixed effects by department and robust standard errors. In models 1-3 the dependent variable is 2018 turnout, and in models 4-6 it is 2019 turnout.

Table 11: Placebo Test, Vote Choice

| | <i>Dependent variable: Duque Votes / Petro Votes</i> | | |
|---|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| All Killed After 2018 Elections | -0.032 (0.056) | | |
| Ex-Combatants Killed After 2018 Elections | | 0.158 (0.116) | |
| Leaders Killed After 2018 Election | | | -0.115* (0.069) |
| Violent Events Post-Accord, ViPPA | -0.013*** (0.004) | -0.013*** (0.004) | -0.012*** (0.004) |
| PDET Municipality | -1.178*** (0.211) | -1.266*** (0.211) | -1.133*** (0.207) |
| NBI Index | 0.157 (0.686) | 0.131 (0.684) | 0.151 (0.686) |
| Distance to Market | -0.006*** (0.002) | -0.006*** (0.002) | -0.006*** (0.002) |
| Percentage Support Polo, 2014 Elections Round 1 | -18.753*** (1.349) | -18.986*** (1.358) | -18.732*** (1.348) |
| Turnout 2014 | 0.368 (0.974) | 0.439 (0.976) | 0.312 (0.972) |
| Turnout 2015 | 6.183*** (1.321) | 6.149*** (1.319) | 6.261*** (1.322) |
| Observations | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 |
| R ² | 0.561 | 0.562 | 0.562 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.546 | 0.546 | 0.546 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 1081) | 2.158 | 2.156 | 2.156 |
| F Statistic (df = 38; 1081) | 36.347*** | 36.431*** | 36.459*** |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All regressions include fixed effects by department and robust standard errors.

Table 12: Heterogeneous Effects by Municipal Ideology

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | | | | | |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Turnout 2018 | | | Turnout 2019 | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| All Killed Before 2018 Elections | -0.004 (0.004) | | | | | |
| Ex-Combatants Killed Before 2018 Elections | | -0.008 (0.007) | | | | |
| Leaders Killed Before 2018 Election | | | -0.005 (0.006) | | | |
| All Killed Before 2019 Elections | | | | -0.005* (0.003) | | |
| Combatants Killed Before 2019 Elections | | | | | -0.008 (0.005) | |
| Leaders Killed Before 2019 Elections | | | | | | -0.006 (0.004) |
| Percentage Support Polo, 2014 Elections Round 1 | 0.070*** (0.022) | 0.073*** (0.022) | 0.067*** (0.021) | -0.054** (0.026) | -0.053** (0.025) | -0.053** (0.025) |
| All Killed Before 2018 Elections : Polo Vote 2014 | 0.015 (0.025) | | | | | |
| Ex-Combatants Killed Before 2018 Elections : Polo Vote 2014 | | 0.006 (0.036) | | | | |
| Leaders Killed Before 2018 Elections : Polo Vote 2014 | | | 0.031 (0.041) | | | |
| All Killed Before 2019 Elections : Polo Vote 2014 | | | | 0.013 (0.018) | | |
| Ex-Combatants Killed Before 2019 Elections : Polo Vote 2014 | | | | | 0.021 (0.027) | |
| Leaders Killed Before 2019 Elections : Polo Vote 2014 | | | | | | 0.011 (0.029) |
| Constant | 0.226*** (0.026) | 0.225*** (0.026) | 0.225*** (0.026) | 0.223*** (0.056) | 0.218*** (0.055) | 0.223*** (0.056) |
| Observations | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,120 | 1,099 | 1,099 | 1,099 |
| R ² | 0.850 | 0.850 | 0.850 | 0.764 | 0.763 | 0.763 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.844 | 0.845 | 0.844 | 0.755 | 0.754 | 0.754 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.037 | 0.045 | 0.045 | 0.045 |
| F Statistic | 156.705*** | 156.888*** | 156.551*** | 87.724*** | 87.445*** | 87.484*** |

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. The regressions include controls for municipalities' level of violence (ViPPA), geodesic distance to the closest market, if the municipality is a PDET municipality, poverty (NBI) and the lagged DV. They are not shown for the sake of space. All regressions are OLS, include departmental fixed effects, and utilize robust standard errors in parenthesis. The dependent variable in regressions 1-3 is 2018 turnout, and in regressions 4-6 it is 2019 turnout.




Figure 3: Other Data Sources, Ex-Combatant Deaths

7.2 Data

Table 13: Municipal-Level Descriptive Stats

| Variable | N | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Pctl(25) | Pctl(75) | Max |
|--|-------|---------|----------|-------|----------|----------|---------|
| Leaders Killed Before 2018 Elections | 1,123 | 0.162 | 0.564 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Ex-Combatants Killed Before 2018 Elections | 1,123 | 0.030 | 0.297 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| All Killed Before 2018 Elections | 1,123 | 0.189 | 0.642 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| Leaders Killed Before 2019 Elections | 1,123 | 0.220 | 0.707 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| Ex-Combatants Killed Before 2019 Elections | 1,123 | 0.072 | 0.502 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| All Killed Before 2019 Elections | 1,123 | 0.292 | 0.985 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 |
| Turnout 2014 | 1,120 | 0.390 | 0.089 | 0.066 | 0.336 | 0.446 | 0.695 |
| Turnout 2015 | 1,099 | 0.684 | 0.088 | 0.174 | 0.627 | 0.748 | 0.933 |
| Turnout 2018 1,120 | 0.520 | 0.094 | 0.076 | 0.471 | 0.582 | 0.737 | |
| Turnout 2019 | 1,101 | 0.697 | 0.091 | 0.172 | 0.635 | 0.764 | 0.953 |
| Votes Duque/Votes Petro | 1,120 | 3.085 | 3.201 | 0.049 | 1.030 | 4.119 | 32.597 |
| Percentage Vote Candidates 2014 | 1,120 | 0.932 | 0.033 | 0.436 | 0.915 | 0.954 | 1.000 |
| Percentage Votes Candidates 2015 | 1,099 | 0.954 | 0.039 | 0.461 | 0.944 | 0.975 | 0.995 |
| Percentage Votes Candidates 2018 | 1,120 | 0.956 | 0.020 | 0.874 | 0.944 | 0.972 | 1.000 |
| Percentage Vote Candidates 2019 | 1,098 | 0.982 | 0.028 | 0.566 | 0.981 | 0.994 | 0.999 |
| Percentage Blank Votes 2014 | 1,120 | 0.040 | 0.026 | 0.000 | 0.026 | 0.051 | 0.512 |
| Percentage Blank Votes 2015 | 1,099 | 0.014 | 0.028 | 0.000 | 0.005 | 0.014 | 0.520 |
| Percentage Blank Votes 2018 | 1,120 | 0.028 | 0.014 | 0.000 | 0.017 | 0.037 | 0.087 |
| Percentage Blank Votes 2019 | 1,101 | 0.018 | 0.028 | 0.001 | 0.006 | 0.019 | 0.434 |
| Percentage Null Votes 2014 | 1,120 | 0.022 | 0.011 | 0.000 | 0.014 | 0.028 | 0.108 |
| Percentage Null Votes 2015 | 1,099 | 0.015 | 0.008 | 0.000 | 0.009 | 0.020 | 0.061 |
| Percent Null Votes 2018 | 1,120 | 0.013 | 0.007 | 0.000 | 0.008 | 0.017 | 0.065 |
| Percentage Null Votes 2019 | 1,101 | 0.013 | 0.008 | 0.001 | 0.007 | 0.016 | 0.053 |
| PDET Municipalities | 1,123 | 0.151 | 0.359 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| NBI Index | 1,120 | 0.227 | 0.178 | 0.016 | 0.107 | 0.284 | 0.960 |
| Distance to Market | 1,120 | 128.843 | 108.395 | 0.000 | 59.734 | 166.762 | 926.467 |
| Violent Events Post-Accord, ViPAA | 1,123 | 1.533 | 11.510 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 268 |
| Percentage Support Centro Democratico 2014 | 1,120 | 0.347 | 0.168 | 0.000 | 0.220 | 0.460 | 0.825 |
| Percentage Support Polo 2014 | 1,120 | 0.100 | 0.070 | 0.000 | 0.052 | 0.131 | 0.632 |

7.3 Robustness Tests: Mechanisms

Table 14: Mechanisms, Participation in All Organization

| | Secure Neighborhood | Secure Neighborhood | Secure Neighborhood | Violence Solution | Importance Elections President | Satisfaction Democracy Colombia |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Intercept | 1.44*** (0.07) | 1.46*** (0.07) | 0.76*** (0.02) | 2.81*** (0.06) | 1.73*** (0.06) | |
| Woman | -0.04*** (0.01) | -0.04*** (0.01) | -0.03*** (0.00) | 0.03** (0.01) | 0.01 (0.01) | |
| Age | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | 0.00** (0.00) | 0.00* (0.00) | 0.00*** (0.00) | |
| Level of Education | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.07*** (0.01) | -0.04*** (0.01) | |
| Ideology | 0.05*** (0.00) | 0.05*** (0.00) | -0.01*** (0.00) | 0.05*** (0.00) | 0.08*** (0.00) | |
| Selective Violence, Community | -0.26*** (0.02) | -0.34*** (0.07) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.05*** (0.02) | -0.09*** (0.02) | |
| Rural | 0.56*** (0.02) | 0.56*** (0.02) | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.05*** (0.02) | 0.07*** (0.02) | |
| Vote 2018 | 0.09*** (0.02) | 0.09*** (0.02) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.29*** (0.02) | 0.02 (0.02) | |
| Organization Participation, All | 0.05*** (0.01) | 0.03*** (0.01) | 0.02*** (0.00) | 0.07*** (0.01) | 0.06*** (0.01) | |
| Ideology : Selective Violence Community | | -0.02*** (0.01) | | | | |
| Organization Participation, All : Selective Violence Community | | 0.09*** (0.02) | | | | |
| R ² | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.05 | |
| Adj. R ² | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.05 | |
| Num. obs. | 33828 | 33828 | 33239 | 33606 | 33569 | |
| RMSE | 1.24 | 1.24 | 0.41 | 1.09 | 1.15 | |

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01; all regressions include fixed effects by region, robust standard errors clustered by household